(P) + 10, 6, 12, 16, 44, 1

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

JANUARY
FEBRUARY
1969

EAST GERMANY

RUMANIA
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
NORTH KOREA

BOOK SECTION

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JAN-FEB 1969
VOL. XVIII 1

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Editorial office: U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C., 20547.

How to Subscribe: Outside of the United States, *Problems of Communism* may be obtained free of charge by writing to the nearest office of the U.S. Information Service. Residents of the United States may purchase annual subscriptions or single copies by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Price per copy: $.50. Subscription price: $3.00.

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Czechoslovakia, Ulbricht, and the German Problem

By Melvin Croan

Every citizen of the GDR will understand, just by glancing at the map, that an intolerable situation would have been created for our republic and the other fraternal socialist countries if antisocialist forces, especially those inspired by West German imperialism, could have pursued their counterrevolutionary activities from the south, that is, from our very flank.

With that bluntly geopolitical argument, the East German party organ *Neues Deutschland* informed its readers of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, declaring that it had been undertaken at the behest of unnamed Czechoslovak "personalities" in order to put an end to "the aggravated rightist course of a group in the leadership of the CPCS headed by A. Dubcek." [1] Apparently not all GDR citizens fully understood. For several days after the invasion, hundreds of East Germans visited the Czechoslovak Embassy in East Berlin to express their solidarity with the Dubcek regime. Others, sons and daughters of highly placed SED party officials among them, behaved even more audaciously; they scrawled protests on walls and distributed homemade leaflets which stated that "nobody is too stupid to think for himself." [2] The rub, of course, was that the Ulbricht leadership *had* been thinking for itself. Its official rationale for the action against Czechoslovakia only too aptly mirrored conclusions that had been reached long before: Czechoslovakia's internal reforms were thoroughly objectionable, not only because they might prove contagious, but also because they might lead to a major breach in the wall of hostility which the Warsaw Pact had raised against West Germany.

Prague's "springtime of freedom" had thus reawakened the East German regime's two deepest anxieties. The first—dread of domestic infection—dates back to 1956, when, to prevent anything like

[1] *Neues Deutschland*, Aug. 21, 1968.

[2] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Aug. 24, 1968.

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a repetition of the June 1953 uprising, the SED leadership had been obliged to bury all differences of opinion within its own ranks in order to take determined measures toward quelling the unrest which had spread from Poland and Hungary. Ever since that time, Ulbricht and his associates have been constantly scanning neighboring horizons for any sign of impending trouble. In the case of Czechoslovakia, they spotted it as early as May 1963, at the Liblice literary conference which "rehabilatated" Franz Kafka—long considered to be among the most "decadent" of writers. Indeed, innumerable SED post-invasion commentaries have pointed to East Germany's early vigilance with evident satisfaction.[3] And in February 1964, when the SED Politburo pounced on Professor Robert Havemann—the most consistent and courageous East German spirit of the 1960's—it sought to establish a connection between his critical opinions and "certain revisionist theories emanating from Prague," theories which were likened to "rotten eggs" that the SED would not allow "to be placed in its nest." [4]

The West German Bogey

At about the same time that the East German regime began to grow apprehensive over intellectual ferment in Czechoslovakia, it exhibited the first unmistakable symptoms of its other, no less serious fear that its East European allies might show themselves lax toward West Germany—a prospect that, in turn, conjured up the larger specter of the GDR's eventual international isolation. One need only recall East Berlin's nervous reaction to Bonn's first small steps toward rapprochement with Eastern Europe. As begun in 1963, these aimed at nothing more ambitious than the establishment of cultural and commercial ties, including the exchange of trade missions. But no sooner had the first trade agreements been signed than East Germany felt impelled to warn its allies against the Federal Republic's alleged intention of using trade to undermine the "socialist development" of the East European countries, to annex West Berlin, and—last but not least—to outflank the GDR politically.[5] The very same note of alarm was sounded recurrently over the next several years, even though this was a period during which West German foreign policy suffered from virtual paralysis. It became decidedly shrill with the announcement of fresh initiatives toward Eastern Europe by the Grand Coalition Government which took office in Bonn at the end of 1966.

The main elements of the Kiesinger-Brandt government's new Eastern Policy—its willingness to establish full diplomatic relations with the East European states, its readiness to initiate talks with the East German authorities about all matters short of formal diplomatic recognition, and its eagerness to improve relations with the Soviet Union—need no elaboration here.[6] Suffice it to point out that behind the reorientation of West German policy lay the new government's conviction that only through the Federal Republic's active association with the quest for detente in Europe could there be any realistic hope for eventual progress toward national reunification. That very consideration, however, gave the Ulbricht regime cause for renewed alarm. Even before the Soviet leaders had made up their own minds to resist Bonn's new Eastern policy, the SED rushed to denounce it as a continuation of "the previous aggressive revanchist policy of West German imperialism," rendered the more dangerous because it would be managed "somewhat more craftily." [7]

Pankow's counter-strategy to Bonn's revised Eastern policy was twofold. First, the GDR escalated its demands upon the Federal Republic to the point of seeking full diplomatic recognition, which was bound to be rejected, and refused offers to negotiate

[3] See the remarks of Klaus Gysi, GDR Minister of Culture, in *Neues Deutschland*, Aug. 29, 1968, and the three-part series "Die geistigen Vorreiter der Konterrevolution," *ibid.*, Sept. 10, 11, and 12, 1968, as well as the remarks of Ulbricht at the 9th SED Central Committee plenum, *ibid.*, Oct. 25, 1968.

[4] *Ibid.* Feb. 13, 1964. Although expelled from the SED in March 1964 and fired from his university appointment, Havemann has nonetheless continued to speak out. In May 1968, he warmly endorsed the Czechoslovak reforms as portending a "radical and uncompromising breakthrough to socialist democracy." (*Svet v obrazech*, Prague, May 21, 1968.) In October 1968, his two teenage sons were among those convicted of "anti-state activities" consisting of "smearing buildings with inciting slogans, manufacturing leaflets, and distributing them," all in connection with Czechoslovakia. The defense counsel, we are informed, "drew attention to the damaging influence which had been exerted upon these young people," but to no avail. The court handed down the sentences requested by the public prosecutor; *Neues Deutschland*, Oct. 29, 1968.

[5] Cf. the statement of Willi Stoph, then acting Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, *Neues Deutschland*, Nov. 15, 1963.

[6] For a fuller discussion, see the present author's "Bonn and Pankow: Intra-German Politics," *Survey* (London), No. 67, April 1968.

[7] These were the remarks of GDR Foreign Minister Otto Winzer as given over East Berlin television on December 4, 1966, that is, before the Grand Coalition had even made its program public.

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about anything less. Secondly, the East German leadership redoubled its efforts to stiffen East European resistance to West German overtures and, in fact, sought to block any rapprochement whatsoever unless the Federal Republic first recognized the GDR.[8] These efforts enjoyed active Soviet backing, especially after Rumania's establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic in early 1967, to which the GDR responded by concluding a series of bilateral treaties of "friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance" with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, by virtue of her crucial geopolitical position, inevitably became the object of particularly close East German surveillance.

Whither Prague?

So long as Novotny was in command, Czechoslovakia appeared to be a reliable component of the "iron triangle" which was meant to link the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia into a solid phalanx against the Federal Republic. To be sure, in August 1967, toward the end of the Novotny era, Prague did agree to the exchange of trade missions with West Germany, but only on rather restrictive terms and as virtually the last of the East European states to enter into this kind of agreement. What was Pankow's guarantee, however, that a different Czechoslovak leadership, more responsive to public opinion, would maintain the desired degree of rigid opposition to West Germany? In the event, no amount of official assurances on the part of Prague's reform leaders managed to allay East German suspicions. On numerous occasions Dubcek and his associates reiterated Czechoslovakia's unconditional endorsement of the GDR's claims to the international status of a separate German state, and they also proclaimed their every intention of honoring Czechoslovakia's commitments under the Warsaw Treaty. But could the new men in Prague be counted on to resist domestic pressures for an improvement of relations with West Germany? Indeed, was it not in their own economic interest to seek better relations? And did they not go on record as being very much in favor of a relaxation of tensions in Europe and in this connection seriously deviate from the East German (and Soviet) contention that the Federal Republic represented a "hotbed of militarism, revanchism, and neo-Nazism"? [9]

Given all these considerations, as well as the SED's palpable distaste for the purely domestic programs of the new Czechoslovak leadership, a deterioration of East German-Czechoslovak relations was inevitable. The deterioration began in earnest at the end of March 1968, when Kurt Hager, a ranking SED ideologist, openly ascribed the trend of Czechoslovak developments to West German influences and singled out Josef Smrkovsky for personal attack.[10] This not only precipitated a notable diplomatic incident, but also prompted the newly unfettered Czechoslovak mass media to unprecedented criticism of the East Germans for their interference in Prague's internal affairs and their tendentious presentation of Czechoslovakia's reforms. If the tightly controlled East German media refrained from countering the attack immediately, that was partly in order to deny the East German population too intimate a glimpse into the dispute. In any case, the restraint proved short-lived. As soon as the Soviet press opened up its major barrage late last spring against "counterrevolutionary elements" in Czechoslovakia, the SED followed with salvos of its own, including a concoction about American tanks on Czechoslovak soil.[11] At the same time, the East German regime took additional prophylactic measures. It began jamming German-language broadcasts from Prague, banned the Czechoslovak German-language weekly, *Volkszeitung*, and restricted the travel of East Germans to the CSSR, which they had hitherto visited in large numbers. The ensuing SED polemics, with their growing emphasis on the "dangers of counterrevolution" and their heavy-handed insistence on the machinations

[8] This position has been labelled a "Hallstein Doctrine in reverse"—a reference to the West German policy, now discarded, which precluded the Federal Republic's establishment of diplomatic relations with any state (save the USSR) that maintained them with the GDR. See Theo Sommer, "Bonn Changes Course," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1967.

[9] Thus, for example, the April 1968 Action Program declared: "We will proceed on the basis of the existence of two German states as well as the necessity of supporting the realistic forces in the Federal Republic."

[10] *Neues Deutschland*, March 27, 1968.

[11] The tank alarm was sounded by the semi-official *Berliner Zeitung* on May 9 and was repeated the following day in the youth organ, *Junge Welt*, as well as by the organs of two of the GDR's minor political parties, *Neue Zeit* (CDU) and *National-Zeitung* (NDP). *Neues Deutschland* devoted itself to more serious business. On May 9, it reproduced *Literaturnaia gazeta's* attack on Jan Prochazka. On May 11, it featured an original attack on two Czech academics who had taken part in a roundtable discussion sponsored by West German Radio. On May 12, it carried a major indictment of a number of Czechoslovak writers and on May 24 ran a full-fledged diatribe by its assistant editor implicating the West Germans in the Czechoslovak reforms.

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of "West German imperialism," tend to support Western press reports to the effect that already by early summer Ulbricht was in favor of taking the most stringent steps against the Dubcek regime.

Ulbricht's Role

But what should one make of the contention that Ulbricht was "the prime mover" behind the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia? Various Western commentators jumped to this conclusion right after the event, and some still hold to it; some even feel that the SED leadership has attained the status of "equal partnership" with the men in the Kremlin, so that the GDR must now be reckoned with as a "dominant factor" in Central European politics. In the opinion of this author, it would be a mistake to exaggerate either Ulbricht's post-invasion influence upon the Kremlin or his role in the decision to intervene.

That decision, as Richard Lowenthal has cogently argued, should be regarded less as a hasty improvisation than as the culmination of certain basic trends in the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet collective leadership over a preceding period of almost two years.[12] In the realm of Soviet foreign policy, the trend was toward preserving the cohesion of Moscow's Eastern European power sphere, which dictated an uncompromisingly tough stand against West Germany. With respect to Soviet domestic policy, the emphasis was on preserving a rigidly disciplinarian dictatorship, and this also predisposed the Soviet leadership against the reformers in Prague. In both respects, the interests of the East German political elite were in basic alignment with those of the Soviet hierarchy. To that extent at least, the Kremlin may have been receptive to Ulbricht's counsel. If, however, as has also been persuasively argued, the military plans for the invasion were prepared well in advance and only awaited the appropriate political pretext for their implementation, Ulbricht's role seems to have been marginal at best. To borrow from the vocabulary of American politics, the term "stalking-horse" might well fit the bill.

Consider what transpired. After the August 3, 1968 meeting at Bratislava, where the Warsaw Pact "loyalists" ratified the agreements reached at Cierna, Ulbricht immediately summoned the *Volkskammer*, East Germany's pseudo-parliament, into extraordinary session. The agenda consisted of a single item: "the struggle for European security." Ulbricht's speech was remarkably moderate in tone with respect to West Germany, and his proposals for an exchange of high level missions between the GDR and the Federal Republic and an expansion of their trade relations seemed to offer hope that the SED might have swung around, at last, to acceptance of a detente in divided Germany. This, at least, was the hope of Bonn, which found Ulbricht's proposals "interesting." In retrospect, however, it seems clear that these proposals amounted to little more than a tactical maneuver meant to set the stage for Ulbricht's ensuing confrontation with Dubcek at Karlovy Vary on August 13. In his fresh guise of moderation and reasonableness toward the Federal Republic, the East German party leader could press the Czechoslovak reformers for a solemn undertaking that they would refrain from unilateral dealings with the West Germans, or, that failing, bring back conclusive evidence of a serious violation of the "spirit of Bratislava."

Face to Face

The circumstances of the Karlovy Vary meeting could scarcely have been less propitious. After all that had gone before, Czechoslovak public opinion was understandably resentful of the Ulbricht visit, and Prague's leaders appreciated this only too well. Moreover, Dubcek himself had presumably been encouraged by Tito—who was visiting Prague while the *Volkskammer* was in session—to stand up for his rights.

What passed between Dubcek and Ulbricht *in camera* can only be surmised. But the communiqué issued at the conclusion of their meeting contained only a passing reference to the opposition of both parties to "revanchism, militarism, and neo-Nazism" in West Germany—the "atmosphere of candor" said to have characterized their discussions apparently produced little else on which they could agree. Their differences were, however, quite evident in the joint press conference that followed. Dubcek, for his part, emphasized that Czechoslovakia was strong enough to defend its border with West Germany alone.[13] Ulbricht, on the other hand, went out of

[12] Richard Lowenthal, "The Sparrow in the Cage," *Problems of Communism*, November-December, 1968.

[13] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Aug. 14, 1968. Dubcek's remark was omitted from the press conference version that appeared in *Neues Deutschland*.

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his way to restate the conditions that would have to be met before Czechoslovakia could even consider establishing diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic. Feigning surprise at learning of certain past irregularities in Czechoslovak public life, such as official censorship and the absence of the secret ballot in party elections, he suggested that the GDR's political experience be taken as a guide to correct procedures. Finally, in what can only be regarded as a heavy dose of cynicism, Ulbricht bade the Czechoslovak press representatives adieu with best wishes for the development of their "socialist consciousness" and told them it was high time for him to go on summer holiday.[14]

Whether or not he actually took such a holiday, it must be assumed that upon his return to Berlin Ulbricht immediately conveyed a completely negative reading of the Czechoslovak situation to Moscow and then awaited further developments. But Ulbricht's report was surely only one among several considerations which the Soviet leaders weighed before reaching the conclusion that Dubcek was either unwilling or unable to live up to *their* understanding of the obligations upon which he had entered at Cierna and Bratislava. In any event, Moscow was independently aware of Dubcek's failure to remuzzle the Czechoslovak media and to make "appropriate" changes in the party and state leadership; furthermore, the most objectionable features of the Czechoslovak reform program seemed likely to be ratified at the impending Slovak and national party congresses.

All these things pointed to the imperative necessity of striking the long-prepared blow without further delay. If, in fact, the die was finally cast only after Karlovy Vary, it surely was not at Ulbricht's urging alone.

After the Invasion

By the same token, although the occupation of Czechoslovakia has unquestionably altered important aspects of the German problem, it has scarcely transformed the SED regime into the ultimate arbiter of Central European politics, much less elevated it to equal partnership with the Kremlin. To be sure, Ulbricht has found repeated occasion to celebrate last August's military action as a shining example of Soviet-East German military cooperation, to the apparent downgrading of the roles played by the other Warsaw Pact participants.[15] It is also true that in sternly lecturing the Czechoslovaks on their past errors and continued shortcomings, the East German First Secretary has once again held up the GDR as a model of political stability and economic efficiency and has presumed to recommend his country's experience as "very important for all progressive forces in the CSSR who are looking for an orientation on the basis of Marxism-Leninism."[16] Moreover, as if to end once and for all any tendency to look to the West for economic assistance, Ulbricht has proclaimed the necessity of constructing socialism "on the basis of one's own resources" as a doctrinal imperative. And, lest this be misconstrued, he hastened to point out that this had nothing in common with "the ridiculous drivel about national autonomy," but meant rather the intensification of economic and scientific ties among the socialist states, and between the GDR and the USSR in particular.[17] Finally, ever since August 1968, the SED has been second to none in rebuking the various Communist critics of the occupation of Czechoslovakia. In this connection, the East German party leaders have not only effusively reaffirmed their own unshakable allegiance to the Soviet Union, they have also renewed demands for the closest possible international coordination under Soviet leadership and, in one instance, broached the desirability of reestablishing an organization of the Cominform type, "at least for the community of European socialist countries."[18]

Party Primacy

In addition to calling for international discipline and coordination, Ulbricht has been retrenching the domestic authority of his own SED. In recent years many scholarly analysts were inclined to regard the GDR as an increasingly rational socio-economic order, directed by a small political clique whose ideological protestations had come to appear less

[14] *Neues Deutschland*, Aug. 14, 1968.

[15] Cf. Ulbricht's remarks to 1968 graduates of the GDR's military academies, *Neues Deutschland*, Oct. 18, 1968, and his speech to the 9th SED Central Committee plenum, *ibid.*, Oct. 25, 1968. By way of contrast, however, it should be noted that while East German troops were stationed in Czechoslovakia, their role was, if anything, played down. Can anyone doubt the reason?

[16] *Neues Deutschland*, Oct. 25, 1968.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] Cf. the remarks of A. Kurella to the 9th SED Central Committee plenum, *Neues Deutschland*, Oct. 24, 1968.

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insistent and inflexible. On the basis of this assessment, some Western commentators anticipated the gradual devolution of decision-making prerogatives to a de-ideologized managerial-technical "counter-elite." [19] But now that Ulbricht is convinced that in Czechoslovakia the "counterrevolution" went hand in hand with the rise of "counter-elites," he is more than ever concerned about the party's monopoly of power. Indeed, in the SED's major domestic pronouncements of the immediate post-invasion period, which Ulbricht expressly urged be studied *in toto*, one point has been hammered home: if the party's primacy is not to be lost, it must be vigorously asserted.

A dictatorship on the defensive may choose to exercise its power in peculiar ways. Theoretical consistency is the very last thing to expect of it. Thus, while engaging in a certain amount of self-congratulation about the "moral and political unity" of the East German population, the SED leadership also insists that "the disappearance of attempts to restore the power of capital" must not be mistaken for "the end of class antagonism." [20] Such theoretical ambiguities do not, however, obscure the party's basic intentions. The SED, maintaining that "the creeping poison of bourgeois ideology is first and foremost directed against the Marxist-Leninist party and its revolutionary ideology and practice," [21] has gone on record as being unalterably opposed not only to any form of political pluralism but also to any increased autonomy in the sphere of industrial management. In fact, it fell to Günter Mittag, the very member of the political elite who seemed most to embody managerial-technocratic attributes, to champion the "leading role of the party." [22] This he did in the course of a stinging rebuke to Günther Kohlmey, a prominent East German economist who found himself in trouble a decade ago for "revisionist" omissions with respect to party control. Now it would appear that this "counter-elite" will have to develop a healthier respect for the disciplinary value of ideological guidance and supervision.

In the ever sensitive cultural realm, which has been held in a straitjacket ever since the end of 1965, the regime has vowed to tighten up even more. Every last trace of "capitalist decadence" is to be eradicated, so that the GDR's "socialist national culture," once rid of vestigial Westernisms, may the more readily fuse into "socialist world culture." [23]

Consider as well the regime's tightening grasp on the younger generation. On the one hand, the SED recently mobilized members of its official youth and paramilitary organizations and put them on public display, under the strictest bureaucratic supervision, in the guise of "today's young revolutionaries." On the other, it arranged swift trials for those youngsters who had the temerity to protest against the invasion of Czechoslovakia, meted out stiff sentences and, to top it off, sought to divert public attention from the entire affair by staging a major outcry against the alleged persecution of students in West Germany.

What all this adds up to is less a picture of dynamism than of a rigid dictatorship—once again obviously distrustful of its own subjects and more than ever bent on insulating them from potentially disruptive outside influences. Small wonder, then, that the SED leadership should now experience genuine stirrings of the old "proletarian internationalism," with its implications of abounding fidelity to the Kremlin. In fact, loyalty to the Soviet Union has always provided Ulbricht and his old guard with one of their most important psychological props; it has served them as a kind of ersatz patriotism, pathetic perhaps, but nonetheless understandable, considering the special difficulties the SED has had to face as the result of Germany's enforced division. But it hardly follows that the Ulbricht leadership has now secured greater leverage on Moscow. Unless the decomposition of the Soviet leadership has gone much further than all available evidence would seem to suggest, a decisive role for Ulbricht in Central Europe seems highly unlikely, especially with respect to Germany itself, where the East-West confrontation is most direct and is a game played for the highest possible international stakes.

[19] See, for example, Peter Christian Ludz, *Partei Elite im Wandel* (Köln and Opladen, 1968) which juxtaposes a "counterelite" to the "strategic clique" in the GDR and describes its political process as one of "consultative authoritarianism." For a less social-scientific, more journalistic presentation along similar lines, see Ernst Richert, *Die DDR-Elite oder Unsere Partner von morgen?*, Reinbeck bei Hamburg, 1968.

[20] See Ulbricht's major doctrinal exegesis entitled "The Role of the Socialist State in the Formation of the Developed Social System of Socialism," delivered at the Walter Ulbricht German Academy of State and Law, and published in *Neues Deutschland*, Oct. 16, 1968.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] See Mittag's remarks to the 9th SED Central Committee plenum, *Neues Deutschland*, Oct. 27, 1968.

[23] See the speech of the GDR Minister of Culture, Klaus Gysi, at the 13th plenum of the State Council, *ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1968, and Ulbricht's remarks at the 9th SED Central Committee plenum, *ibid.*, Oct. 25, 1968.

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This is not, however, to argue that East German anxieties and ambitions can be dismissed as of no consequence. On the contrary, to the extent that these views may reenforce the Soviet leaders' own inclinations, they can be quite important. As long as a common defensive-isolationist mood prevails in East Berlin and Moscow, neither is likely to advance, or even seriously consider, constructive proposals for a relaxation of tensions within Germany. If anything, both are only too liable to renew efforts to undermine West Germany's domestic political stability and weaken its ties to the West.

The Implications for Bonn

However one looks at it, the occupation of Czechoslovakia was a blow to the Federal Republic's Eastern Policy and a setback to West German hopes for progress toward eventual national reunification. As such, it was bound to have domestic political repercussions. To be sure, the Kiesinger-Brandt government has stated its intention of pursuing the quest for detente "without illusions," and that course still appears to enjoy solid public support. But from the right wing of the West German political arena voices have been heard to denounce detente as an utterly pernicious policy. And from the left, critics have risen to denounce Bonn for not having gone further to accommodate Soviet interests and to demand that the Federal Republic now extend full diplomatic recognition to the GDR.[24] That this situation is a constant invitation to outside exploitation goes almost without saying.

Two recent examples should suggest what is at stake. Let us take, first, Ulbricht's remark to the Fifth Polish Party Congress last November to the effect that West Germany's Social Democratic leaders had privately promised West German diplomatic recognition of the GDR only to go back on their word.[25] Surely this was nothing more than a blatant attempt to disrupt Bonn's Grand Coalition by encouraging those West German politicians who were trying at that moment to prove the existence of some sort of collusion between the SPD and the SED. Another case in point is the reemergence last September, only a month after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, of a legalized West German Communist Party with a new official designation (German Communist Party, DKP, rather than Communist Party of Germany, KPD) but under the same old leadership. For some time, officials in Bonn had been giving serious attention to the matter of how best to circumvent the West German Supreme Court's 1956 ban on the KPD so as to restore the Communist party to legality as an earnest of Bonn's desire to withdraw from the Cold War. More recently, they had begun considering whether to institute proceedings toward outlawing the radical right party, the NPD (German Nationalist Party). Is it really too far-fetched to suggest that it was in Moscow's interest to press for the legalization of the German Communist Party precisely to forestall the demise of the NPD, a tangible symbol of its accusations of "neo-Nazism" in the Federal Republic?

Although perhaps minor in themselves, all such developments point to the continued if not increased importance of the West German bogeyman to efforts aimed at consolidating both internal political order in East Germany and Soviet hegemony over its entire East European bastion. Considering that recent Soviet propaganda has been emphasizing the allegedly total failure of the Federal Republic's international policies, it would appear that the men in the Kremlin, along with their East German protégés, now feel that their interests would be well served by the emergence of nationalist frustration as a major influence upon West German domestic politics. In the final analysis, it is this development, more than any other resulting from the occupation of Czechoslovakia, which renders the German problem not merely as intractable as ever, but potentially more dangerous than it has been heretofore.

[24] See, for an extreme example, the declaration signed by a large group of German intellectuals who contend that a major share of responsibility for the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia falls on the Federal Republic. In their view, because West Germany refuses to recognize the GDR, its "diplomatic feelers to Rumania and Czechoslovakia" could only have appeared as "a policy of 'disrupting the socialist camp,' isolating the GDR, and disguised political aggression against the USSR": "Erklärung zur politischen Situation in Mitteleuropa," *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Nov. 29, 1968. What is particularly objectionable about this line of reasoning is its confusion between cause and effect. No policy of Bonn's brought about the political reforms in Prague, and it is highly questionable whether a different policy on the part of the Federal Republic could have staved off Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. As to formal diplomatic recognition of the GDR, what is to guarantee that it would lead to a relaxation of tensions?

[25] *Neues Deutschland*, Nov. 13, 1968.

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Rumania Today

I: Towards "Integration"

By J. F. Brown

EDITOR'S NOTE: Below is the first of a two-part analysis of contemporary developments in Rumania. Here Mr. Brown deals with Bucharest's domestic policies; in our next issue he will discuss the trends and implications of Rumanian foreign policy.

The aim of this essay is to outline the principal features of Rumanian domestic policy as they have emerged since March 1965, when Nicolae Ceausescu succeeded Gheorgiu-Dej as First Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party. In all political systems, the questions of what policy is pursued at any given time and why cannot be understood without examining the motives and ambitions of the personages involved, and especially the conflicts to which they give rise. Nowhere is the connection between policy and the struggle for power more crucial than in Communist countries, and nowhere perhaps has it played so decisive a role as in Rumania. Some account, therefore, of Ceausescu's efforts to consolidate his leadership is necessary before any analysis of his domestic policy is attempted.

Ceausescu's election to the post of First Secretary following the death of Gheorgiu-Dej in March 1965 came as no surprise either to the party or to the population at large. A favorite of the old leader, he had long been groomed for this role. Furthermore, as Central Committee secretary in charge of cadres and organization, he had acquired over the years a formidable basis of support within the party *apparat*. Yet, at 47, Ceausescu found himself in the anomolous position of representing the *younger* generation of Communist officials in a party whose upper echelons were still dominated by men of Gheorgiu-Dej's generation. The support he could muster from the lower ranks of the *apparat* was offset by the fact that there was no one in the Politburo who owed his position to him, and who could thus be implicitly counted upon as a reliable ally. All of which made it imperative for the new First Secretary to proceed with caution and circumspection.

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Quadruple Challenge

The challenge, or the checks, to Ceausescu's authority came—at least potentially—from four powerful leaders: Chivu Stoica, Gheorghe Apostol, Emil Bodnaras, and Alexandru Draghici. The first two had been close associates of Gheorghiu-Dej—Stoica as Prime Minister from 1955 to 1961, when he was replaced by Ion Gheorghe Maurer, and Apostol as First Deputy Premier and former Party First Secretary (1954–55). Stoica still retained a large following among veteran senior party officials, and Apostol—at 52, the youngest member of Gheorghui-Dej's immediate entourage—could count on strong backing from the trade union organization, which he had led for several years. The third, General Bodnaras, had undergone a virtually unique transformation from "Muscovite" to nationalist, surviving in the process two decades of Rumanian political infighting. A restraint rather than a threat to Ceausescu, his strength lay in the armed forces and in his own prestige and personality.

But the most serious challenge to Ceausescu was posed by Alexandru Draghici, a man who, though a little older, was of the same political generation as the First Secretary. Draghici could be called Ceausescu's natural rival. Both had entered the Central Committee in 1948, and their careers had subsequently paralleled each other, with Ceausescu rising through the hierarchy of the party *apparat* and Draghici eventually securing control over the security services as Minister of the Interior. The classic polarization of power in Communist systems —the party bureaucracy versus the security apparatus—was thus personified and dramatized in the rise of these two men.

The immediate problems of position and privilege in the post-Dej era were solved by a return to the principle of "collective leadership." With Ceausescu as First Secretary, Stoica took over Gheorghiu-Dej's other post as President of the State Council (head of state), Maurer remained Premier, and Apostol remained—for the time being—the only First Deputy Premier. In keeping with this division of responsibility, the party statutes were altered to prevent one man from combining party and government functions on the ground that each required full time activity.

Ceausescu was fortunate in that a party congress took place—as previously scheduled—in July 1965, only four months after he assumed office. There the support he had built up during his years in the Secretariat showed to advantage. The Central Committee was considerably enlarged, thus making Ceausescu the direct patron of many new members. Even more significant was an institutional innovation called the Executive Committee, an intermediate body between the Politburo (renamed the Standing Presidium) and the Central Committee. The establishment of this body certainly had its functional and administrative rationale, but its primary importance to Ceausescu was that it provided him with a new means of promoting his own supporters and accelerating the implementation of his own policy.

At the same time, however, Ceausescu was unable to alter the Standing Presidium to his advantage, nor was he able—at so early a juncture—to pack the Executive Committee with his own supporters. The balance of power within the regime was still too delicate for that. But it soon became obvious which individuals and—perhaps more important—what types of men he favored for his governing coterie. Three names merit special mention: Paul Niculescu-Mizil, whom he entrusted with the highly sensitive tasks of interparty relations and agitation and propaganda; Ilie Verdet, who was eventually charged with a whole range of economic responsibilities and now seems a likely successor to Maurer as Premier; and Virgil Trofin, Gheorghiu-Dej's youth leader, now in charge of party organization and cadres. By 1968, these three men were in the Standing Presidium, providing Ceausescu with the weight that was necessary to tilt the scales in his favor.

In addition, Ceausescu brought a number of new men—almost all under 50 years of age—into slightly lower levels of the party and government apparatus. They share a number of common characteristics: ability, the training and outlook of administrators rather than technical specialists, and loyalty to Ceausescu, who had thrust them into positions of relative prominence and prestige. They are the forerunners of others who, in the shadow of their leader, will personify the character and method of Ceausescu's rule.

From Strength to Power

Before Ceausescu could fully organize his own team of followers, he had to break the power of his rivals. His methods, as it turned out, were both firm and subtle. First to be weakened was his principal adversary, Draghici, who was deprived of his position at the Ministry of the Interior by being elected to the Secretariat at the party congress, which made him subject to the "separation of

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—The Editors

powers" clause in the party statutes referred to above. On paper, Draghici still looked powerful as a member of the Standing Presidium, the Executive Committee, and the Secretariat. But he had lost his control over the security apparatus—which was precisely Ceausescu's intention. A few months later, the prestige accruing to Apostol from his position as the one and only First Deputy Premier was deeply undercut when Bodnaras and Alexandru Birladeanu, the man chiefly credited with Rumania's economic boom and for several years her chief Comecon negotiator, were also made First Deputy Premiers. Moreover, by outwardly promoting these two veterans, Ceausescu may also have faciliated the simultaneous promotion to the Standing Presidium of Niculescu-Mizil and Verdet, thereby beginning the inroads of his own supporters into the party's topmost body.

But the most significant move against his rivals was one that was kept quiet for more than two years: the establishment in November 1965 of a commission of inquiry into the trial and execution of Lucretiu Patrascanu in April 1954.[1] Draghici had been Minister of the Interior at the time of this trial and had drawn up the case against Patrascanu on the instructions of Gheorghiu-Dej; Apostol, Bodnaras, and Stoica had all been members of the Politburo and thus had presumably been acquainted with the proceedings. Patrascanu's death, therefore, became for Ceausescu a decisive weapon in the struggle for power. Knowing, as did everyone else,[2] what the findings of the commission would be, he waited patiently for two and a half years, thus preserving the semblance of a united front vis-à-vis the USSR, and finally disclosed the findings only in April 1968.

That timing was of the essence, and that Ceausescu had indeed been faced with considerable dissension within the ranks was evidenced by the rumbles of discontent that accompanied the gradual displacement of the Old Guard during 1966 and 1967. It was also confirmed, albeit indirectly, by Ceausescu himself: in an article published in May 1967, he warned other "fraternal" parties against trying to establish contact with members of the Rumanian CP, some of whom would presumably be ready to cooperate with outside forces and even "participate in actions" against their party's policy.[3]

There were grounds enough for the discontent revealed in this warning: the power struggle itself; the speed and extent of Rumanian defiance of the Soviet Union; the mounting campaign for increased economic efficiency and the sweeping personnel changes it implied; the greater (if still firmly controlled) permissiveness in public life; the new inroads into the private life of Rumanian citizens—*e.g.*, stricter control over abortion and divorce; and finally, Ceausescu's personal behavior—his arrogance and the undoubted cult of personality he was building up in the country as a whole.

On the Offensive

There was considerable speculation in the summer of 1967 as to which "party members" the CPSU or some other fraternal party had been seek-

[1] Decision of the Rumanian Communist Party's Central Committee on Rehabilitation of Some Party Activists, *Agerpres*, April 26, 1968.

Patrascanu was Rumanian Minister of Justice from 1944 to 1948, a member of the Communist Party Central Committee and, for a short time in 1946, of its Politburo. Immediately after the February 1948 congress he was dismissed from his posts and in April 1948 arrested. He was finally executed in April 1954 on charges of organizing a plot against the regime, being an Anglo-American spy, *etc.* Stefan Foris, rehabilitated at the same time as Patrascanu, was Secretary-General of the Rumanian CP from 1940 to 1944. He was executed in 1946. In addition to Patrascanu and Foris, a number of Communist leaders of the interwar period, some of them executed in Moscow, were also rehabilitated.

[2] Though Ceausescu can claim, borrowing Novotny's famous phrase, that "he was not in the topmost leadership at the time" of Patrascanu's execution, he was promoted to the Secretariat and candidate-membership of the Politburo immediately after it. Indeed his current role as the crusader against evil hardly squares with his performance and rise under Gheorghiu-Dej. For example, at the November-December 1961 CC plenum, held after the 22nd CPSU congress, he thoroughly defended Gheorghiu-Dej's role since August 1944, referred to Foris as a security agent and savagely attacked Miron Constantinescu, purged in 1957 but now rehabilitated. He did not, however, attack Patrascanu; *Scinteia*, Dec. 13, 1961.

[3] Nicolae Ceausescu, "The Leading Role of the Party in the Stage of the Completion of the Construction of Socialism"; *Scinteia*, May 7, 1967.

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ing to suborn. It was certainly significant that the first public moves against Draghici were made only two months after the appearance of Ceausescu's article: the security apparatus was severely criticized, especially on the basis of its past activities (when Draghici was in charge), for acting like a "state within a state." With Ceausescu himself issuing the most severe criticism [4]—so soon after his article in *Scinteia* at that—there was little doubt that the First Secretary was taking the offensive not only against Draghici but against all who obstructed his path to complete ascendancy.

An important milestone on that path was passed in December 1967 at a specially convened National Party conference. As part of a major reorganization of party and state—the full ramifications of which will be discussed later—the conference elected Ceausescu to replace Stoica as President of the State Council. The party statutes were again changed so that Ceausescu could now hold the two offices that Gheorghiu-Dej had combined—in utter contradiction to the "separation of powers" thesis originally advanced by Ceausescu himself. Immediately after the conference, Ilie Verdet was made the *only* First Deputy Premier, thereby strengthening Ceausescu's hold on the government apparatus. (Apostol, initially the sole First Deputy Premier, then reduced to joint First Deputy, was sent back to his old post as trade union chief.)

Having thus demonstrated his powers, Ceausescu was now able to administer the decisive blow to Draghici by producing the incriminating evidence against him which the Patrascanu commission had been holding in readiness for many months. But Ceausescu did not stop there. In an audacious move strongly reminiscent of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, he implicated Gheorghiu-Dej in both the execution of Patrascanu and the "killing" in 1946 of Stefan Foris, who had been Secretary-General of the Rumanian Party from 1940 to 1944. To level such charges against Dej, a man who had led the Rumanian Party for two decades—and who at his death had virtually achieved the status of *pater patriae*—was a gamble on Ceausescu's part; its aim, no doubt, was to show that the old era was definitely over and that a new and more hopeful period in Rumanian Communist history had begun.

At a Central Committee plenum in April 1968, Draghici was dismissed from all his positions, with the possibility of a future trial left open. Stoica, Bodnaras, and Apostol were censured for having accepted without question the injustice that had been perpetrated on Patrascanu. All three accepted the blame, kept their positions, and continued to play an active part in public affairs; but their authority was seriously undermined, and their future was made more dependent on Ceausescu than ever before.

All in all, the April plenum radically altered the situation in the Standing Presidium. With Trofin replacing Draghici and thus reinforcing Niculescu-Mizil and Verdet; with Bodnaras, Stoica, and Apostol under the cloud of the Patrascanu revelations; and with the two remaining members, Maurer and Birladeanu,[5] enjoying prestige but little political power, Ceausescu had finally succeeded in establishing himself as the virtually unchallenged master of Rumania's political life.

In his relentless march to power, Ceausescu had made liberal use of all the classic weapons of political infighting: the manipulation of factions; institutional innovations; a scant regard for constitutionalism; the advancement of his own claim to charismatic leadership at the expense of his predecessor's reputation; the assiduous cultivation of friends, allies, and subalterns; and finally, the ruthless use of political blackmail as a means of demoralizing and crushing his opponents. If success is the measure of political greatness, Nicolae Ceausescu may certainly be regarded as one of the outstanding politicians of recent times.

The Foundations of Policy

Rumanian policy today—domestic and foreign—rests squarely on two major principles: first, an intense nationalism, about which more will be said further on; and second, "integration"—which is simply a variant of the Bolshevik notion of undiluted centralism extended to all areas of public life and implemented with all the means available to a modern Communist dictatorship. Under Ceausescu, perhaps even more than under his predecessors, the ruling party holds itself totally responsible for the

[4] *Agerpres*, July 18, 1967.

[5] Before this issue went to press, Birladeanu's complete political retirement was announced at the December plenum of the Central Committee. This comes as no surprise. Birladeanu's star had been fading since 1966, and Ilie Verdet had been assuming more and more of his supervisory responsibilities in the economic sphere. *Agerpres* of December 18 gave ill health as the reason for Birladeanu's resignation, and it is true that his health has been failing for some time. At the same plenum, two other party veterans, Petre Borila and Alexandru Moghioros, also retired on grounds of ill health. —Ed.

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development of all aspects of national life. If the party does not specifically direct all public activity, then it coordinates it and is ultimately responsible for its success or failure. Under this system, there is no room whatever for group autonomy or for any social, political, economic, or cultural process that may tend to generate spontaneity; all national or local activities must be firmly integrated within the overall political process and be at all times under the direct or—at least—indirect control of the central authority.[6]

It is this that accounts for the "conservative" nature of the reforms introduced under Ceausescu. For example, the economic reform, which was made public in October 1967 and approved at the national conference in December, contained many of the decentralizing features and some of the reliance on indirect controls that marked the economic reform measures adopted by other East European countries; yet its centralizing features remained very strong. The "cult of the plan" continued: the plan must define "in the most precise and detailed manner possible" the goals for the development of production, the extension of technical progress, the qualitative improvement of products, and increased economic efficiency. Again: "As we descend the organizational step toward the basic units [*i.e.*, the local enterprises], the number of compulsory indicators increases so as to comprise all the essential aspects of economic activity."[7] Actually, the main beneficiaries of the decentralization process are not the local enterprises but the newly-created associations, or "industrial centrals," which will exert extensive control over individual enterprises. This is in contrast to the reform in Hungary, which does not call for such intervening associations, and in even sharper contrast to the preinvasion trend in Czechoslovakia. The same timidity is particularly manifest in the key area of price formation, doubtless reflecting official abhorrence of the spontaneity that could develop if prices were given more freedom to find their own level.

Nowhere is the preoccupation with integration more evident than in Rumanian policy toward the Hungarian minority. The changes in territorial administration approved at the national conference last December finally abolished the Magyar Autonomous Region established in 1952, instituting a new nationwide administrative setup based on 39 counties (*judets*) in place of the old one based on 17 larger regions. One of these new counties, Harghita, has an overwhelming preponderance of Szeklers and another, Mures, has a very strong Magyar element;[8] however, the important thing is that the concept of an autonomous region, with all that it implied, was totally abandoned in favor of an arrangement that facilitates the assimilation of the Hungarian minority into the Rumanian political community and ensures greater control over that process. One can debate endlessly, of course, how much the integrationist rationale is simply a smokescreen for anti-Hungarian chauvinism. It is a delicate subject on which there is not enough objective information to permit a measured judgment. In any case, it seems clear that the policy toward the Hungarian minority fits easily into the general pattern of Ceausescu's policy of enhancing central authority by firmly integrating the activities of subordinate political entities.

Fusion of Party and State

The cornerstone of this policy was laid at the national conference of last December which authorized a wholesale revamping of the political structure involving the fusion of party and governmental (or state) positions at various levels. The conference approved the principle that a "single comrade in the leadership should take care of a specific field of activity in both the party and state spheres," that "one and the same comrade should be entrusted with a specific field of activity in both the Central Committee and the government," and that in each of the newly-constituted counties the

[6] I have been helped greatly in my estimate of Ceausescu's internal policy by a brilliant essay by Professor Kenneth Jowitt, of the University of California at Berkeley, entitled, "The Romanian National Party Conference December 1967: An Analysis in Terms of Ideology, Power and Conflict," February 1968, mimeographed.

[7] "Draft Directives of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party on the Perfecting of the Management and Planning of the National Economy in Keeping with the Conditions of the New Stage of Rumania's Socialist Development," *Agerpres* in English (1968). See Henry Schaefer, "Rumania 'Perfects' Economic Management and Planning," RFE Research, Nov. 30, 1967.

[8] The Szeklers settled in Transylvania earlier than the Magyars. They are probably of Turkic (possibly Avar) stock. By the 11th century they had adopted Magyar as their language, but for centuries thereafter they enjoyed autonomy under the Hungarian crown. which regarded them all as of noble birth. The last remnants of Szekler autonomy were suppressed by Austria after the Revolution of 1848 and today, except for a few isolated communities where ancient Szekler traditions have survived, there is little difference between the Szeklers and Magyars—except to the Rumanian regime which, for its own reasons, constantly distinguishes between the two.—Ed.

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posts of party first secretary and chairman of the People's Council should be held by the same person.[9] The result was an unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of the party, symbolized at the highest level by Ceausescu's assumption of the presidency of the State Council.

This was not just integration; it was *Gleichschaltung*. Statements proclaiming the leading role of the party are not formal rhetoric in Rumania; the party means what it says: "The Central Committee," Ceausescu declared, "is responsible to the party, to the people, and to the nation for the orientation of activity in running the economy, material production . . . ideological activity, foreign policy, defense and all sectors of social life." [10] At first sight, it might appear that the resolution adopted at last December's national conference allows the government more power than it does the party in the actual implementation of national economic policy; but even here, given the integration of party and state positions, the government's new Economic Council and its counterparts in every one of the 39 counties will actually serve as party watchdogs. The Central Economic Council, it may be noted, is headed by Manea Manescu, a Central Committee secretary and a close personal follower of Ceausescu. The latitude granted on paper to government economic agencies would therefore seem to be more apparent than real.

The Rumanian penchant for absolute party supremacy stands in sharp contrast to developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In Yugoslavia, in Czechoslovakia before August 20, and even in Hungary, the trend has been towards a more pluralistic society in which interest groups are recognized and granted a considerable degree of autonomy. The Rumanian party has firmly rejected this concept. Different strata of society are recognized, to be sure, but control over and responsibility for them are vested securely in the central leadership. In the "liberal reform" states of Eastern Europe, the mass organizations—*i.e.*, the youth unions, trade unions, unions of agricultural cooperatives, etc.—have already emerged as embryonic pressure groups with profiles of their own. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia has partially reversed this process in that country, and despite the Budapest regime's insistence that its own reform program will continue, the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia will certainly make the Hungarians wary of letting reform stray onto the uncharted paths that it took in Prague. Rumania's rejection even of a carefully controlled pluralism would therefore seem to be more in line with the kind of "safe" domestic policy clearly demanded by the Soviet Union at the present time. Indeed, in his handling of domestic affairs, Ceausescu has given the Soviet Union little legitimate cause for complaint. Probably Moscow's only real objection to Rumania's domestic policy is simply that it has strengthened Ceausescu and made him less susceptible to Soviet influence. But this is an objection that the Soviet leadership can hardly express openly.

The Progressive Side

It is the strong element of caution in Rumanian policies that has made the leadership's philosophy look conservative and even reactionary. But it would be unfair to leave it at that. Ceausescu's ambition is to make Rumania an efficient and modern state. This, he seems to believe, can best be done within an integrated, centrally-oriented framework, but one which still leaves room for substantial public initiative and participation. Hence the progressive features that are to be found in the economic reorganization and other aspects of domestic policy over the last three years. Hence, also, the great stress on technical improvement, as well as the latitude given to specialists of all kinds.

It is to Ceausescu's credit that he realized that these measures alone were not enough. What was needed, above all, was to stimulate a national reawakening after 20 years of sterility, inhibition, and —at times—terror. With this objective in view, Ceausescu has sought—within the limits set by his own philosophy—to inspire genuine mass participation and real communication between rulers and ruled, particularly since the national conference of December 1967, when he felt that his power was safely consolidated.

Thus, in his public speeches, he has called for criticism and the expression of individual opinion, even if "erroneous," since no one, as he put it, has a monopoly on truth.[11] Public organizations were exhorted ("ordered," a skeptic might prefer) to become more assertive, and the Grand National

[9] Ceausescu's report to the National Party conference, *Scinteia*, Dec. 7, 1968.
[10] *Ibid.*

[11] See, for example, his speech to the executive staffs of the county party organizations and People's Councils; *Scinteia*, March 23, 1968.

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Assembly was to play a more active role. The various legal reforms prepared during this period, particularly those providing for a new Penal Code and the strengthening of the individual's constitutional rights against the state, and even the reforms referred to earlier affecting the Ministry of the Interior—these, too, were part of the concerted campaign to reassure and reawaken the public.[12] Above all, the rehabilitation of Patrascanu and the exposure of the crimes of the Gheorghiu-Dej era were presented to the Rumanian people as an earnest of the regime's readiness to admit at least some of the crimes of the past.

It would be easy, of course, to dismiss all this as mere maneuvering. But since the end of 1967, both Ceausescu's policies and his protestations have had a remarkable ring of consistency.

Fighting the Fascist Image?

In another apparent effort to put a more attractive face on Rumanian domestic policy, Ceausescu has begun to check a nationalistic tendency which, for various reasons, he may have believed was going too far.

The strongly nationalistic coloring of Rumania's communism, which was evident under Gheorghiu-Dej and became intensified under Ceausescu, has been remarked by all students of Eastern Europe. As pointed out earlier in this article, nationalism deeply infuses all Rumanian policy. However, this nationalism, nurtured by mass propaganda of a "blood-and-soil" character unhealthily reminiscent of many parts of Europe between the wars, has naturally led to speculation about the real nature of the Rumanian regime. Some observers feel that Ceausescu's rule is leading Rumania not toward communism but rather toward some kind of social fascism, and that this tendency is at work not only in Rumania but also in other East European Communist regimes (notably Poland) and the Soviet Union itself.

This argument merits more thorough exposition and examination than it has received up to now, but what is primarily relevant to this discussion is the fact that Ceausescu has recently seemed at some pains to exorcise this fascist image. Right after the April 1968 plenum, for example, he quite unexpectedly made a point of dissociating his regime from the traditions of the Iron Guard, the pre-war radical fascist party, attacking it as a "bunch of assassins" completely alien to the spirit of contemporary Rumania.[13]

Of more practical significance was the subsequent breaking-off of Ceausescu's long connection with the ultranationalist literary figure, Eugen Barbu. A writer of some talent and forceful personality, Barbu had for several years been considered the leader of a school of Rumanian intellectuals which combined violent nationalism with advocacy of an almost Zhdanovite restrictiveness on both the form and content of the written word. He was regarded as Ceausescu's watchdog on the cultural scene, and in 1967 his appointment to head the country's top cultural committee was deemed a distinct possibility. But by the spring of 1968 Barbu's authority was clearly on the wane. Attacks on him by his numerous opponents, including many young writers standing for free expression in literature, increased in the literary press. Finally, in June, Barbu was dismissed from the editorship of the periodical *Luceafarul*—an act that not only served to put a damper on the blatant nationalism (and antisemitism) for which he stood, but also provided great encouragement for liberal writers throughout Rumania.

In Rumania, as elsewhere, nationalism and antisemitism have often gone hand in hand. It may therefore be significant that Ceausescu, at a Central Committee plenum in December 1968, elevated two Jews—Petre Lupu and Gheorghe Stoica—to full membership in the Executive Committee, thereby reversing an earlier trend in his regime toward eliminating Jews from political life. At least in part, this may be interpreted as another effort to efface the image of fascism from contemporary Rumania. It should be added that the Rumanian Jewish community had already been impressed by Ceausescu's refusal to take a stand against Israel during and after the Arab-Israeli conflict of June 1967.

What prompted Ceausescu to check a nationalist trend which he had initially done so much to encourage? One can only surmise. Perhaps he was genuinely alarmed at the pace of the trend and the

[12] The new penal code was published on April 6, 1968. Ceausescu, in a speech at Tulcea on April 12, called it second in importance only to the new socialist constitution of 1965. "Nobody," he said, "can be allowed to violate the country's laws . . . by saying he believed he had to act in other ways. It must be clear to everybody that the norms established by laws are compulsory for all . . ." Radio Bucharest, April 12, 1968.

[13] Speech to the party active of the Bucharest municipality; *Agerpres*, April 27, 1968.

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aggressiveness of some of his followers, or perhaps it was more a tactic dictated by the exigencies of the moment: the regime may have been highly sensitive—for commercial and diplomatic reasons —about its image in the West, where the impression was growing that Bucharest 1968 was getting to be more and more like Bucharest 1938. But perhaps there was an even more urgent reason. As their relations with Moscow worsened, the Rumanians may have feared that Soviet charges of nationalism against them—hitherto only indirect or in a relatively minor key—might be made more explicit and pointed by references to a "resurgence of fascism" in Rumania. Whatever the specific reason for Ceausescu's moves, it seems clear that they were defensive in character, designed to make his leadership less vulnerable to possible outside attacks.

The Czechoslovak Crisis

Roughly speaking, the new phase in Ceausescu's domestic policy coincided with the momentous turning point in Czechoslovak policy. The Rumanian national conference took place in December 1967, and Dubcek replaced Novotny the following month. Moreover, just as the Czechoslovak reform movement accelerated after the removal of Novotny from the presidency in March 1968, so the relaxation in Rumanian policy became more perceptible after the rehabilitation of Patrascanu in April. This coincidence naturally led to speculation that Rumania was herself embarking on a new "liberal" course in the style of Czechoslovakia's, or—more credibly—that Ceausescu, anticipating the contagious effect of the spontaneous developments in Czechoslovakia, was determined to head off the dangers of spontaneity by initiating and presiding over a more circumspect and controllable relaxation in his own country.

As to the speculation that Bucharest was following Prague's liberal example, the only real similarity between the Rumanian and Czechoslovak developments was in their timing. As previously indicated, the Rumanian reforms had little in common with the spirit of the movement in Prague. As for the more credible argument that Ceausescu's low-keyed reform was intended to isolate Rumania from the liberal "excesses" emanating from Prague, it is quite possible that the momentum of the Czechoslovak events may have caused Ceausescu to advance the timing of his relaxation, but it is also likely that this relaxation was already in the making and had its own independent Rumanian rationale. The exposure of past crimes and the Patrascanu rehabilitation at the Rumanian party's April plenum had obviously been in preparation for some time, and in terms of both the party power struggle and Ceausescu's domestic program, they fall quite readily into the logical sequence of events since Gheorgiu-Dej's death in March 1965.

The official Rumanian attitude toward the new Czechoslovakia was certainly one of pleasure at the prospect of a new addition to the "club of independents." In the domestic sphere, however, the spontaneity of the developments in Prague struck at the very basis of the Rumanian leadership's philosophy. Indeed, Ceausescu took care, in April 1968, to warn both educators and creative artists that the bounds of Marxism-Leninism, though widened considerably over the past three years, were not to be crossed in Rumania's intellectual life.[14] And this warning may well have been issued with the Czechoslovak events in mind. True, Ceausescu defended Prague's right to pursue its own domestic policy, but this was to uphold the much touted Warsaw Pact principles of independence, sovereignty, and noninterference. Prague's domestic policy was its own business—not Moscow's. By the same token, it was not Rumania's business either and had no direct relevance for her.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Ceausescu's courageous denunciation of it, and the implicit threat that the invasion posed to Rumania itself had the effect of uniting the Rumanian people behind the regime more closely than ever before (just as Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia appears to have made the squabbling nationalities within that federation realize the value of unity—at least for a time). This support gave Ceausescu a much-needed boost at a time when the Rumanian people, dissatisfied with the continuing low standard of living, the slow pace of reform, and irksome restrictions such as the new decrees on divorce and abortion, were beginning to feel that nationalism alone—however much they had welcomed it at first—was no longer enough.

While the danger of Soviet intervention in Rumania still appeared imminent, Ceausescu sought to dramatize popular determination and unity by creating a sort of Rumanian "Home Guard" consisting of armed detachments of workers, peasants, and intellectuals for the defense of the fatherland.

[14] Speech to all-country conference of the Association of Plastic Artists, *Agerpres*, April 19, 1968; also to a Central Committee plenum, April 24, 1968, during a debate on educational problems, *Agerpres*, April 24, 1968.

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And once the immediate danger had receded, he moved quickly to preserve the new unity that had been attained. He did this not by adopting any new policy but by stepping up the policies of relaxation and encouragement of mass participation already begun. On the heels of the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia, he spearheaded a series of speechmaking tours by top party and government leaders throughout the country, the main aim of which was to stress the national unity of all Rumanian citizens and the right of all to participate in decision-making and to offer open, honest criticism.[15] This campaign was particularly intense in Transylvania and the Banat, the areas with the largest Hungarian and German populations—a fact that may have reflected the regime's continuing anxiety about the loyalty of these minorities, especially the Hungarian, after the decision of the previous December to abolish the Magyar Autonomous Region.

In October 1968, the heightened emphasis on unity received its organizational expression in the creation of a "Front of National Unity," a belated Rumanian equivalent of the national-front amalgams that exist, under various names, in all the other East European states.[16] The Front, as approved by a Central Committee plenum, includes representatives of the party, the trade unions, the Union of Communist Youth, the Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives, the National Council of Women, the Writers' Union, and various other professional unions of journalists, artists, engineers, lawyers, *etc.* Most significant is the fact that two new councils representing the Hungarian and German minorities are also included in the Front. This was certainly a concession to the feelings of these minorities, though it did little to attenuate the policy of full integration discussed earlier. These new councils will still be very much under centralized control, and the headquarters of both will be in Bucharest. The President of the whole Front of National Unity, not surprisingly, is Ceausescu himself.

In a further move to bolster unity and public confidence, the regime also continued the rehabilitation of victims of the show trials of the early 1950's, a process begun the previous April. The most prominent figure to be rehabilitated was Vasil Luca, the notorious partner of Ana Pauker in the first years of the Communist regime. A member of the Hungarian minority who had spent many years in Moscow, Luca was a Politburo member and Minister of Finance. He became a bitter rival of Gheorgiu-Dej and went down to defeat with Pauker and Teohari Georgescu when the struggle for power between the "Muscovites" and the "home Communists" was finally decided in 1952 in favor of the latter. Put on trial in October 1954 (after Patrascanu), Luca was sentenced to death—afterward commuted to life imprisonment—on charges of having collaborated with the prewar secret police and having aided in the suppression of the Bela Kun republic in Hungary. Sentenced along with Luca were several other important state officials. In September 1968, the Rumanian Supreme Court ruled that the charges against Luca and his co-defendants had been false and the sentences unjust.

In a simultaneous ruling, the Supreme Court also reversed the sentences handed down in the famous Danube-Black Sea Canal trial in the fall of 1952.[17] The canal project, a typical pharaonic venture of the times, was started in 1949 and abandoned in 1953—a disaster in both conception and execution. Scapegoats had to be found, of course, and they included managers and engineers of wildly assorted backgrounds, at least as officially alleged—former Iron Guardists, a member of the prewar rightist Goga-Cuza Party, erstwhile kulaks, capitalists, and at least one secret service agent. Some of the accused were sentenced to death, and the rest to long terms of imprisonment up to life. The political impact of the belated repudiation of these past injustices should not, of course, be exaggerated, but the official rehabilitation of individuals representing a broad cross-section of Rumanian political and social life may have given further reassurance to the public that the slate was being wiped clean.

The country, then, was made more closely united by the Czechoslovak crisis. But what of the party? Did Ceausescu's bold defiance of Moscow, followed by Soviet pressure and the threat of direct intervention in Rumania itself, cause waverings and dissension, and possibly even encourage a pro-Soviet faction to emerge? Moscow may have counted on this, but there is no evidence whatever that such hopes were fulfilled. In the tense situation created by the August events, Ceausescu's consolidation of

[15] Ceausescu speech at Turda, *Agerpres*, Aug. 30, 1968.

[16] There already existed in Rumania a national front organization called the People's Democratic Front, but it was essentially dormant and only revived periodically before parliamentary and local elections.

[17] These two decisions of the Supreme Court were announced by *Agerpres*, Sept. 18, 1968.

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his own power over the preceding three years, culminating in the purge of Draghici in April 1968, clearly stood him in good stead. Not only was he able to surmount the dangers, but he apparently turned them to good account. Potential challengers did not dare make their appearance amid the massive national demonstration of discipline and unity.

The Real Dilemma

In March 1969 Ceausescu will have been at the helm just four years, and in that short span he has made a clear and unmistakable imprint on Rumanian life. With his rivals in disarray and both party and people at least temporarily united, Rumania might seem to be moving toward the orderly and measured implementation of policies whose outlines have already been drawn. Yet this prospect is far from certain. Indeed, Ceausescu's domestic policies were hastily conceived and in some respects arbitrary, and they have left in their wake latent resentments which may lead to future upheaval and eventually force a reassessment of the whole philosophy on which those policies are based.

Considerable readjustments may even become necessary in the near future. The economic reform, the administrative-territorial reorganization, and most of all the fusion of party and state are such controversial and ponderously bureaucratic innovations that it is hard to see how serious dislocation and dissension can be avoided for very long. In that event, the temporary unity created by the Soviet threat might quickly evaporate, and while such a development might not necessarily imperil Ceausescu, it could multiply his difficulties. Like Khrushchev—and the similarities between the two men are worth an article in themselves—he may find himself constantly in quest of a viable philosophical framework for his policies. The accusation of "hare-brained scheming" may yet be made again —this time in Bucharest rather than in Moscow.

There is another potential parallel with Khrushchev. The repudiation of Gheorgiu-Dej is bound to bring in its train political, ideological, and psychological problems which will persist well into the future. How far is the repudiation to go? Whom is it to encompass? Will its rejuvenating effect outweigh the demoralization it must certainly cause in some quarters? Will the shock galvanize or paralyse? Will the population be impressed or just cynical? Much will depend on the extent and efficacy of reform measures and on whether national unity can be maintained.

But even more fundamental are the problems of reconciling an essentially authoritarian and integrationist policy with the encouragement of public initiative and participation, of combining the control on which that policy is predicated with the freedom necessary to build a modern, efficient system.

For the time being, the problem is not particularly acute in the absence of any alternative centers of power or challenge such as are already present or emerging in other East European societies, but there is no assurance that Rumania will remain immune from them (even now there are embryonic signs of youthful restiveness [18]), especially if dislocations actually do result from Ceausescu's imperfectly conceived and arbitrarily imposed innovations. Moreover, public opinion, encouraged and strengthened by the regime's continuing policy of relaxation, may cease to be satisfied with the empty gratification of national pride and become assertive enough to shake the foundations of Ceausescu's concept of government. Hence the political wedding he is now trying so hard to arrange between supreme central authority and genuine public initiative may well prove to be one of incompatibles, as have other such weddings in the past.

[18] See, for example, "Rumania's Youth," RFE Research, Dec. 13, 1968.

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North Korea:
Profile of a Garrison State

By B. C. Koh

In a speech marking the 20th anniversary of the birth of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in September 1968, Premier Kim Il-song stated that the past two decades had wrought a "fundamental metamorphosis" in all aspects of North Korean life, with the result that "our people have established an advanced socialist system in which everyone can enjoy a free, happy life free from exploitation and oppression." What is more, he continued, North Korea not only had laid a firm foundation for an independent national economy but also had achieved full political autonomy in the world arena.[1] If his remarks were largely empty rhetoric based either on a grand illusion or on a colossal lie, they nevertheless did contain at least one indisputable truth: North Korea has indeed undergone profound changes over the last twenty years.

[1] *Nodong Sinmun* (P'yongyang), Sept. 10, 1968. This is the organ of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party.

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The re-entry of North Korea into the world spotlight at the beginning of 1968 with the triggering of the Pueblo incident served as a grim reminder that in this ever-shrinking world no nation is too small to threaten the peace and security of the entire world community. In North Korea's case, moreover, its smallness is dangerously deceptive. Not only does it boast a well-trained, Soviet-equipped army of over 350,000 men, 500 Soviet-made jet aircraft, modern air-defense missile complexes, and a militia of 1.2 million men and women. It also is ruled by a Stalinist dictator whose fanatical dedication to revolutionary objectives is surpassed only by his brash audacity in seeking to carry them out in the face of all obstacles. North Korea's past record of strident belligerency, coupled with its seemingly inexhaustible potential for precipitating international crises, amply justifies a fresh look at its internal and external situation. This article will attempt to sketch a profile of the P'yongyang regime, focusing on recent developments.

Durable Leadership

Despite recurrent political turmoil, North Korea's leadership has proven remarkably durable over the years. Like Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh, Kim Il-song of North Korea has been a towering and

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seemingly permanent fixture in his nation's political life for the last two decades. But, unlike Mao and Ho, Kim did not capture political power on his own. While he had a substantial record of anti-Japanese guerrilla activity in Manchuria in the 1930's, his role in the final liberation of Korea from Japanese rule was nil.

Kim's seizure of power in North Korea was made possible primarily by the solid backing of Soviet occupation authorities. Given the extent of actual, if not formal, Soviet influence in post-liberation North Korea, it seems inconceivable that he could have accomplished what he did without Soviet support. For what he accomplished was the gradual emasculation and ultimate eradication of political rivals with seemingly much stronger claims to leadership than his own. But while he unquestionably owed his initial rise to power and prominence to his Soviet sponsors, it must be acknowledged that he quickly demonstrated a flair for Machiavellian maneuvering that firmly established his credentials as a formidable political tactician in his own right.[2]

Pitted against at least four potentially influential political groups—*i.e.*, the so-called Soviet-Koreans, the returnees from the Chinese Communists' North China stronghold of Yenan, the domestic Communist faction, and the nationalist faction—Kim struggled long and hard to overcome the opposition and forge his own power base. In due course, his faction—made up of persons thoroughly subservient to his direction and dominated by his former comrades in the anti-Japanese partisan campaigns[3]—gained, and has since maintained, an unassailable position in North Korean politics.

Kim's task of political consolidation was rendered far from easy by the fact that all but one of the rival groups were led by nationally known political figures whose reputation and prestige completely overshadowed his own. Moreover, his attempt to gain legitimacy in the eyes of his countrymen by masquerading under the name of a lengendary national hero[4] was probably more of a liability than an asset because it was such a patent sham. Few intelligent Koreans were likely to be deceived into thinking that the youthful Soviet protégé (Kim was born in 1912) was the same revolutionary hero rumored to have died long before.

In order to overcome these handicaps, Kim resorted to tactics reminiscent of his political mentor, Joseph Stalin. One by one, his potential and actual rivals were eliminated, some by assassination, others by purge, and still others by execution after being convicted on trumped-up charges. At least one prominent Soviet-Korean was driven to commit suicide. In addition, Kim relied heavily on the symbols and rhetoric of nationalism, glibly extolling the virtues of national pride and political and economic independence and exhorting the masses to rally behind his revolutionary banner.

The Cult of Kim

Finally, Kim developed a personality cult rivaled in its pathological dimensions only by "Mao worship" in Communist China. History has been distorted and falsified to glorify his revolutionary record—to such an extent, in fact, that Kim emerges as the only true revolutionary of any consequence in the annals of Korea's anti-Japanese struggle. His portrait is prominently displayed in all public places and gatherings, and his words of wisdom are tirelessly studied and recited by schoolchildren, factory and farm workers, party and government cadres, editorial writers and commentators. Indeed, no article or commentary in a North Korean publication is deemed complete or proper unless it is liberally sprinkled with quotations from Comrade Kim.

The last few years have seen a marked increase in the vehemence of the cult, with Kim now being exalted as the "beloved leader of the 40 million Korean people." Since the population of North Korea by itself is estimated at only about 13 million, this obviously means that Kim claims leadership of all of Korea, both North and South. He is also referred to as a "great leader in the interna-

[2] On North Korea's early political history, see Kim Ch'ang-sun, *Pukhan sibonyon-sa* (Fifteen-Year History of North Korea), Seoul, Chimunkak, 1961; Dong Jun Lee, *Hwansang kwa hyonsil: na ui kongsan chuui kwan* (Fantasy and Fact: My Observations of Communism), Seoul, Tongban T'ongsin-sa, 1961; Chong-Sik Lee, "Politics in North Korea: Pre-Korean War Stage," in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), *North Korea Today*, New York, Praeger, 1963, pp. 3–16; Glenn D. Paige and Dong Jun Lee, "The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea," in *ibid*, pp. 17–29; and Dae-Sook Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918–1948*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967, ch. 10.

[3] Dae-Sook Suh has dubbed Kim's faction "the partisan group." (See his "The Elite Group of North Korea," Paper read at the annual conference of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, Ill., March 20–22, 1967.)

[4] While the revolutionary record of the legendary Kim Il-song has yet to be corroborated, it was widely believed among the Korean masses—a fact of considerable importance. It is also to be noted that the present Kim Il-song had actually used the magic name during his guerrilla days. Nor was he the only Korean to masquerade under that name. See Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement, op. cit.*, pp. 256–93.

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tional Communist and workers' movement and an outstanding Marxist-Leninist." As proof of this, whenever Kim's speeches and articles are reproduced in foreign Communist publications—an increasingly frequent occurrence these days—the news makes banner headlines in the North Korean newspapers. Typical of the efforts of the press to promote the cult of Kim Il-song, an October 1967 issue of *Nodong Sinmun* (Labor News), the daily organ of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), devoted no less than three of its four pages to adulation of the "beloved leader." [5] Even Kim's deceased parents have recently been enshrined as demigods in North Korea.

If North Korea's political leadership has proven itself singularly durable, it has not, however, gone unchallenged. There have been at least two known instances of serious political opposition—once in 1953 and again in 1956. In August 1953, twelve leading members of the domestic Communist faction were tried by a North Korean military tribunal on charges of espionage and treason. The official accusation that they had served as "American spies" was plainly preposterous, but it is quite probable that they did conspire to carry out a *coup d'état* against Kim. Nine defendants were sentenced to death and promptly executed. Two years later it was revealed that the leader of the group, Pak Hon-yong, who allegedly was to have been installed as North Korea's new chieftain, had met the same fate.[6]

The second challenge to Kim's dictatorial rule was inspired by the anti-Stalinist mood that developed in the Communist camp in the wake of the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956. A coalition of the Yenan and Soviet-Korean factions in the KWP tried to stage a rebellion against Kim, accusing him of seeking to perpetuate a personality cult of his own, of violating the principle of collective leadership, and of enforcing faulty economic policies. Pak Ch'ang-ok, a Soviet-Korean and one of the leaders of the rebellious group, is said to have written a secret letter to Khrushchev invoking the latter's help. Not only did Kim Il-song survive the challenge, however, but he proceeded to crush the remnants of the opposition. A new blood bath is said to have been averted only through the intervention of Moscow and Peking, which dispatched Anastas I. Mikoyan and P'eng Te-huai, respectively, to P'yongyang to urge moderation.[7]

The most recent development affecting the power structure in P'yongyang was the wholesale reorganization of the KWP Central Committee in October 1966. At the 14th Plenum of the Fourth Central Committee, which was held on October 12, 1966, at the close of a party "Representatives' Conference," [8] several important changes were instituted. First, a new six-member Presidium was created within the all-powerful Political Committee of the

[5] See *Nodong Sinmun*, Oct. 12, 1967.

The Cult of Kim Il-song

Apart from the revolutionary ideas and wise leadership of Comrade Kim Il-song, we cannot think of the victorious development of the Communist movement in Korea and the restoration of the fatherland, the epochal changes which have taken place in our country, and the present-day happy life of our people, nor can we talk about the future development of our revolution and the ultimate victory of the cause of socialism and communism. The history of the development of the Korean revolution for more than 40 years is the glorious revolutionary history of Comrade Kim Il-song, the respected and beloved leader. . . .

The great revolutionary ideas . . . of Comrade Kim Il-song, his original theories, methods and lines, the rich revolutionary achievements and experiences attained by him, and the immortal revolutionary traditions established by him are precious assets for the victory of the cause of socialism and communism in our country and the whole world and an outstanding contribution to enriching the treasure house of Marxism-Leninism and developing the world revolution.

—From *Nodong Sinmun* (P'yongyang). January 7, 1969.

[6] Kim Ch'ang-sun, *op. cit.*, pp. 138–50. For details of the charges against Pak and others, see Kim Il-song's report to the Third Congress of the KWP on April 23, 1956, in *Choson Nadongdang chesamch'a taehoe chuyo munhonjip* (Principal Documents of the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party), P'yongyang, KWP Press, 1956, pp. 74–83.

[7] Kim Ch'ang-sun, *op cit.*, pp. 150–160.

[8] The so-called "Representatives' Conference" (*taep'yoja hoeui*) was called by the KWP leadership in lieu of the Fifth Party Congress. Held in P'yongyang during October 5—12, 1966, the conference was attended by 1,275 delegates and 48 alternates. For details, see *Nodong Sinmun*, Oct. 6–13, 1966.

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Central Committee, becoming the functional equivalent of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. Second, the posts of chairman and six vice-chairmen of the Central Committee were abolished. Third, an 11-member Secretariat headed by a General Secretary was established. Finally, the membership and candidate membership of the Political Committee were slightly expanded.

A striking feature of these changes was the thoroughness with which Kim Il-song's "partisan group" entrenched itself in North Korea's power hierarchy. All of the six top men who were named to both the Presidium and the Secretariat—Kim Il-song, Ch'oe Yong-son, Kim Il, Pak Kum-ch'ol, Yi Hyo-sun, and Kim Kwang-hyop, in that order—traced their careers back to the anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns in Manchuria, and the other strategic positions in the Secretariat and the Political Committee also were virtually monopolized by the "partisan group." Because of the guerrilla background of the principal members of this group, the KWP leadership took on a preponderantly military complexion. Conspicuously absent from the leadership roster were such names as Nam Il, Chong Il-yong, Kim Ch'ang-man, and Pak Chong-ae, all of whom had been members of the Political Committee on the eve of the reorganization. What set these persons apart was their common lack of affiliation with Kim Il-song's guerrilla force. Both Nam Il and Chong Il-yong stemmed from the Korean exile group in the Soviet Union, Kim Ch'ang-man from the Yenan group, and Pak Chong-ae from the domestic Communist faction. Though stripped of their high party positions, Nam Il and Pak Chong-ae were retained in the government hierarchy, Nam as a Vice-Premier of the DPRK and Pak as a Vice-Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, North Korea's nominal legislature.

In October 1967, *Dong-A Ilbo*, South Korea's largest newspaper, reported that the KWP had undergone a new purge in which the principal victims were Pak Kum-ch'ol and Yi Hyo-sun.[9] The report, purportedly based on information obtained from sources in P'anmunjom, appears to have been well-founded, for both Pak and Yi have disappeared from public view since about the middle of 1967. Be that as it may, the outstanding fact about North Korea's power structure is that political dominance remains in the firm and seemingly indestructible grip of Kim Il-song, who concurrently occupies the posts of General Secretary of the KWP, Premier of the DPRK, and Commander-in-Chief of the Korean People's Army.

Political Goals

The continuity in North Korea's political leadership has been paralleled by a similar continuity in its political objectives. In an eight-point program unveiled at the opening session of the Supreme People's Assembly on September 10, 1948—one day after the proclamation of the founding of the DPRK—Kim Il-song set forth national unification, the building of an independent national economy, and the strengthening of national military power as the overriding goals of his regime.[10] These same goals have since been consistently reaffirmed and are being pursued with increasing vigor today.[11] Indeed, the history of North Korea's first two decades can be viewed primarily in terms of an unremitting quest to achieve these basic objectives.

According to Kim Il-song's well-articulated logic, these objectives are functionally interrelated. In his view, national pride demands that Korea enjoy nothing less than completely equal and independent status in the community of the nations—a status which can be neither attained nor effectively maintained without an independent national economy. To achieve the goal of an independent economy, however, Kim deems it imperative that the Korean Peninsula be unified as one nation. While he insists that the chief beneficiary of such unity would be the South, he is well aware that the two halves of Korea mutually complement each other economically and in other ways. He further argues that a nation which is only half free cannot be a truly free and independent one. In his view, the South is enslaved by the "American imperialist aggressors and their lackeys," who not only have frustrated his repeated attempts to reach a peaceful settlement of the unification issue but are frenetically preparing for a new invasion of the North. Therefore, Kim argues, his regime has no alternative but to arm

[9] *Dong-A Ilbo* (Seoul), Oct. 2, 1967.

[10] Kim Il-song, "Choson Minjujuui Inmin Konghwaguk ui Chongkang" (The Political Program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), in *Kim Il-song sonjip* (Selected Works of Kim Il-song), Vol. II, P'yongyang, KWP Press, 1964, pp. 269–74.

[11] See, *e.g.*, Kim Il-song's speech to the Supreme People's Assembly on December 16, 1967 (*Nodong Sinmun*, Dec. 17, 1967) in which he outlined a new ten-point program for the DPRK. The program reaffirmed the same goals.

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itself on a colossal scale. This in turn underlines the need to step up the industrialization program, for the backbone of military might is industrial capacity. Moreover, the reasoning goes, the stronger and more prosperous the economy of North Korea becomes in comparison with the South, the easier it will be for the Communists to win over the minds and hearts of their compatriots in the South.

The Economic Record

Following the well-established Communist pattern, North Korea has resorted to a series of national economic plans designed to realize its goal of economic independence. In the period since the Korean War, it has pursued a policy of placing major emphasis on the development of heavy industry, while simultaneously developing light industry and agriculture. Determined to do away with the "colonial lopsidedness" of the economy and to develop a diversified economic structure capable of producing all essential goods at home, North Korea has devoted intensive effort to constructing machine-building, metallurgical, chemical, electric power, and textile industries. By 1959, when the Communist regime claimed to have completed its First Five-Year Plan in two and a half years, it boasted that it had become a "socialist industrial-agricultural nation" on the threshold of self-reliance.[12]

After a year of "adjustment," P'yongyang launched the most ambitious of all its economic plans—the Seven-Year Plan of 1961-1967. This plan proposed to carry out a massive modernization of North Korea's industrial and agricultural sectors which would, hopefully, result in marked increases in both the quantity and quality of production. According to the regime's optimistic estimates, North Korea's total industrial output would grow at a rate of 18 percent per year, and by 1967 the North would be producing in one year as much as it had produced during the entire period of the First Five-Year Plan.

In its drive toward industrialization, North Korea has been aided by four crucial factors: (1) a sizable industrial base built by the Japanese, at least the skeleton of which survived the Korean War; (2) comparatively abundant natural resources; (3) a totalitarian form of government capable of mobilizing human and material resources with ruthless efficiency; and (4) generous economic and technical assistance from the Communist bloc. It should be added that Kim Il-song, like Mao Tse-tung, is a strong believer in the infinite capacity of the masses, if properly mobilized and infused with ideological fervor, to work miracles. He has thus incessantly urged his compatriots to work to the limit—and often beyond the limit—of their capabilities for the glorious future of their Communist fatherland. He has even emulated Mao's disastrous "Great Leap Forward" program for Communist China by launching North Korea's so-called Ch'ollima (Flying Horse) movement, embodying some of the features of its Chinese predecessor. Unlike Mao, however, Kim tempers his faith in the power of the masses with a profound respect for technical expertise. He has laid major emphasis on developing a large pool of technicians and constantly urges rank-and-file workers and peasants to engage in technical innovations, for which they are rewarded with lavish praise and the title of "hero" or "Ch'ollima rider." Perhaps the relative longevity of the Ch'ollima movement (which is still active) is attributable in part to its reliance not only on ideologically inspired mass enthusiasm but also on technical proficiency.

Nevertheless, the Seven-Year Plan failed to work. Not only were its targets overambitious and unrealistic to begin with, but a number of unforeseen stumbling blocks developed. First, the emergence in South Korea, in May 1961, of a regime led by military men with a militant and uncompromising attitude toward the Communist North led P'yongyang to divert a growing share of its limited resources from industrial to military programs. Secondly, the widening split in the Communist world drove North Korea into the Chinese camp in 1962, resulting in the withdrawal of Soviet economic, technical, and military assistance. Thirdly, North Korea's overheated economy apparently reached a point of diminishing returns.

Signs of trouble were not hard to find. P'yongyang's Central Statistical Bureau openly admitted underfulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan targets in its annual statistical reports and then stopped issuing such reports altogether in 1967. Equally revealing was the announcement at a party conference in October 1966 that the Seven-Year Plan would be extended for three years—an open admission that the plan was lagging far behind schedule.

[12] For a summary of North Korea's economic plans and their claimed accomplishments, see *Facts About Korea*, P'yongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961, pp. 87–120; and Ch'oe Chung-guk, *Inmin kyongje pumun kujowa kyongje palchon sokto* (The Structural Components of the People's Economy and the Rate of Economic Growth), P'yongyang, Sahoe Kwahagwon Ch'ulp'ansa, 1965.

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Efforts to Recoup

One cause of difficulty was removed in May 1965 when North Korea patched up its differences with the Soviet Union and thus regained its most important source of outside economic aid. At the same time, Kim Il-song redoubled his efforts to whip up the enthusiasm of the working masses by popularizing such leadership techniques as the Ch'ongsanni method and the Taean work system, both borrowing from the methodology of the mass line as practiced in Communist China. The former directs the leaders of agricultural cooperatives to make frequent on-the-spot inspections, to invite suggestions from rank-and-file farmers, and to enhance the peasant's sense of participation.[13] The latter, in Kim Il-song's words, is "an excellent embodiment of the principle of collective Communist life: 'One for all and all for one.'" "In this system," he adds, "superiors help their subordinates, the well-informed teach the less-informed, all the people help one another as comrades, and all the workshops cooperate closely."[14]

Kim also has long emphasized the need to bridge the gap between cities and countryside. In his "Theses on the Socialist Agrarian Question in Our Country," [15] he stated that if the "inevitable" transition of North Korea from socialism to communism was to be hastened, it was imperative to upgrade the living standard of the peasants and abolish backwardness in the countryside. This, he stressed, requires a concerted effort on the part of the entire Korean people. Industrial workers should work hand in hand with their peasant countrymen with a view to improving farming methods and carrying out "technical, cultural, and ideological revolutions" in the rural areas. Underlying all these ideas is Kim's determination to remold the entire North Korean population into revolutionary cadres who are both technically competent and single-minded in their dedication to the party—and, above all, to Kim Il-song.

The resumption of substantial Soviet aid, coupled with the steps taken by the regime to refine its leadership techniques and promote production efficiency, has apparently stemmed the deterioration of North Korea's economic situation, but there is little evidence to suggest a positive acceleration of the pace of economic growth. A major brake on economic development is the regime's inordinately large military spending: in fiscal 1968 North Korea devoted 30.9 percent of its total national expenditures to "national defense." [16] Moreover, despite an already serious shortage of labor, the regime continues to enervate the population by requiring participation in periodic military training, interminable political study sessions, and increasingly frequent mass rallies. North Korea's recent economic stalemate, however, should not blur the fact that the cumulative efforts of the P'yongyang regime have succeeded in transforming a war-ravaged country into at least an embryonic industrial complex that is fairly impressive by Asian standards.

The KWP's Military Line

As already noted, the strengthening of North Korea's military capability has been an essential component of P'yongyang's long-term strategy for achieving the unification of Korea under Communist rule. This remains true in spite of occasional shifts in the tactics of the unification struggle. After the Korean war stalemate shattered Kim Il-song's dream of achieving unification by outright military invasion, the North turned instead to the methods of psychological warfare and underground subversion. It flooded Seoul with a stream of overtures ranging from a proposal for cultural exchanges to a plan of North-South confederation. Simultaneously, it stepped up efforts to infiltrate the South with the ultimate objective of setting in motion a Communist-oriented revolutionary movement.

While P'yongyang was still waiting for this campaign to produce tangible results, the political situation in the South was suddenly and drastically altered by the *coup d'état* of May 16, 1961, which brought a military-controlled government to power in Seoul. One of the avowed aims of the leaders of the *coup* was to crack down on leftist and liberal elements in the South which had been agitating for negotiations with the North. Thus, the effect of the coup was to deal a devastating blow to P'yongyang's dream of fomenting a Communist revolution in the South, while at the same time it immensely heightened North Korea's fears for its own security.

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[13] For a recent description of this method, see Kim Il-song's congratulatory message to agricultural workers in *Nodong Sinmun*, Feb. 17, 1968.

[14] Kim Il-song, "On Further Developing the Taean Work System," in *Selected Works*, Vol. II, P'yongyang, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1965, p. 376.

[15] P'yongyang, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1964.

[16] *Nodong Sinmun*, April 26, 1968.

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Alarmed and disillusioned, Kim Il-song flew to Moscow and Peking in July of that year and concluded mutual defense treaties with both major Communist powers. North Korea also sought to obtain increased Soviet military aid to bolster its armed forces. In November 1962 a North Korean delegation headed by former Defense Minister Kim Kwang-hyop, currently fourth-ranking in the KWP leadership, visited Moscow with this in view but was apparently cold-shouldered by the Kremlin.

It was against this backdrop that the KWP convened the Fifth Plenum of its Fourth Central Committee during December 10–14, 1962. The Plenum adopted a new "military line" for the party which set forth the following principles: (1) make a cadre out of every soldier, (2) modernize the army; (3) arm the entire people; and (4) turn the whole country into an impenetrable fortress.[17]

This line was reaffirmed by the KWP "Representatives' Conference" of October 1966, at which Kim Il-song called for a two-sided intensification of the defense effort under the slogan, "Let Us Couple Economic Construction With Military Construction!" Calling this simply a continuation of "the basic strategic direction we have been following for several years in response to the changing situation," he declared that the increasing militancy of "United States imperialism and its puppets in the South" not only demonstrated the wisdom of this policy but dictated its more vigorous pursuit. The coupling of economic and military construction, he acknowledged, would inevitably slow down North Korea's industrialization program, but there was no alternative because the United States and South Korea were "running about like mad dogs in preparation for a new invasion" of the North.[18]

Parallel with its efforts to augment the strength of the People's Army through a combination of thorough ideological indoctrination and improved military technology, the North Korean regime has sought to mobilize and train the population at large to serve as an adjunct to the regular armed forces in case of need. Acting on the assumption that modern warfare vastly increases the importance of mass mobilization and participation,[19] North Korea has organized a nationwide militia force known as the "Workers-Peasants' Red Guards" (*Nonong Chogwidae*). Each Red Guard regiment consists of about 3,000 men and women and constitutes a self-contained unit with its own medical, armored-car, and automatic-rifle units. Every militiaman or militiawoman is armed with a rifle of North Korean manufacture. Each regiment is divided into 12 battalions of 14 platoons each, and each platoon consists of 18 persons.[20]

Escalation of Violence

Meanwhile, far from abandoning its hopes of nurturing revolutionary elements in the South, the P'yongyang regime markedly increased both the volume and scale of its subversive activities against the Republic of Korea (ROK). In 1967, for example, the number of clashes between North Korean intruders and South Korean or United Nations forces increased tenfold over the previous year. Hundreds of South Korean fishing boats were harassed and frequently captured by North Korean patrol boats operating in South Korean territorial waters. Each time such incidents occurred, they were widely publicized in the North Korean press, which blamed them on the "provocative acts of the American imperialist aggressors' "spy ships" and invariably warned that future provocations would be met with "stern measures."

Indeed, the incidents and the accompanying North Korean warnings had become so frequent and ritualistic that by the end of 1967 no one but the propagandists in P'yongyang seemed to pay any further attention to them. Besides, the captured South Korean ships and fishermen were invariably released. This is, perhaps, the reason why North Korea's repeated warnings against violation of its territorial waters by "American spy ships" apparently eluded the attention of North Korea watchers both in Seoul and Washington until the stunning seizure of the USS Pueblo off the North Korean coast near Wonsan on January 23, 1968. Such warnings had been issued, for example, on November 11 and December 21, 1967, and on January 8 and 12, 1968.[21]

The Pueblo seizure followed just two days after a spectacular but abortive attempt by infiltrated

[17] *Choson chungang yon'gam* (Korean Central Yearbook), P'yongyang, Choson Chungang T'ongsin-sa, 1963, pp. 184–85.

[18] Kim Il-song, "Hyon chongse wa uri tang ui kwaop" (The Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party), *Kulloja* (theoretical journal of the KWP: P'yongyang), October 1966, pp. 24–26.

[19] See Ho Hon, "Uri tang ui kunsa noson" (Our Party's Military Line), in *Nodong Sinmun*, Dec. 5, 1967.

[20] *Toitsu Chosen Nenkan* (One-Korea Yearbook), 1967–68, Tokyo, Toitsu Chosen Shimbunsha, 1967, p. 356.

[21] See *Nodong Sinmun* for these dates.

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North Korean commandos to raid the presidential mansion in Seoul, and both incidents represented the logical culmination of P'yongyang's steadily escalating campaign of violence and vilification against South Korea and the United States. The commando raid, in which a 31-man suicide squad penetrated to within 800 meters of the "Blue House," the official residence of President Park Chung Hee, before being stopped, was a daring maneuver which, had it been successful, would certainly have plunged South Korea into a grave political crisis. Even in its failure, it was partially effective in that it generated a climate of fear, uncertainty, and tension.

The Pueblo

The Pueblo incident was equally bold, and much more devastating in its impact. The United States, after all, was North Korea's No. 1 enemy—its erstwhile foe on the battlefield, the main deterrent to its military conquest of the ROK, and the leader of the "imperialist camp." P'yongyang had eagerly sought any and every opportunity to harass and humiliate the United States. More important, North Korea sorely needed ammunition for propaganda use both at home and abroad. At home, the capture of a genuine American intelligence ship and its crew, allegedly within North Korean territorial waters, could be effectively exploited to magnify the threat of impending American and South Korean aggression against the North and thus prod the North Korean population to heighten their vigilance and revolutionary fervor. Abroad, the incident could be played up as a demonstration not only of North Korea's enhanced capacity to wage the anti-imperialist struggle but also of the vulnerability of "US imperialism," lending weight to the KWP's international line advocating a united Communist front against imperialism, particularly in Vietnam. Aside from the propaganda impact, moreover, the Pueblo itself, with its sophisticated electronic gear and highly trained crew, constituted an extremely valuable military prize. Finally, few events could have been more gratifying to the personal pride and ego of Kim Il-song than the seizure, which not only thrust him into the spotlight of international attention but also served to vindicate his policies of all-out military preparedness in the eyes of the North Korean public.

Both the commando raid and the Pueblo incident were jubilantly played up by the North Korean press. For several days *Nodong Sinmun* carried a stream of reports claiming that guerrilla insurrections had spontaneously erupted throughout the South and that the Seoul regime was on the verge of collapse. On the Pueblo, the paper published pictures of the ship's officers and crew, as well as supposed confessions by crew members and photopraphs of documents captured aboard the ship allegedly proving its espionage activities inside North Korean territorial waters. For several weeks the paper also carried statements from North Korea's allies and friends abroad supporting the seizure of the Pueblo and condemning the "provocative acts" of the United States.

During the ensuing months Washington strenuously explored all possible ways of obtaining the release of the ship and its 82 surviving crew members, eventually succeeding in making the dispute the subject of direct secret talks between the US and North Korean military representatives at P'anmunjom. P'yongyang, however, adamantly insisted that there could be only one solution: The United States must make a public apology for violating North Korean territorial waters and pledge not to engage in similar hostile activities in the future. At the same time, North Korea continued to exploit the affair for propaganda purposes, putting members of the captured crew on display at carefully prepared "press conferences" and flaunting alleged confessions *ad nauseam*.

Finally, in December 1968, after nine long months of seemingly fruitless diplomatic maneuvering, the negotiations suddenly produced a settlement which was as bizarre and enigmatic as the circumstances surrounding the original seizure of the Pueblo. North Korea agreed to a formula whereby the United States would first verbally repudiate and then sign a document prepared by P'yongyang, acknowledging North Korea's claims, in return for which the Pueblo's crew would be released.[22] Upon the completion of this strange ritual, the 82 surviving crew members and the ashes of one sailor who had died of wounds suffered during the seizure were handed over to the United Nations Command at P'anmunjom on December 23, 1968. The Pueblo, however, remained in North Korean hands.[23]

The reasons for North Korea's decision to release the Pueblo's crew, like those which prompted its initial decision to seize the ship, can only be speculated upon. For one thing, P'yongyang very likely

[22] *New York Times*, Dec. 23, 1968.
[23] *Ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1968.

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calculated that the usefulness of the crew from the standpoint of both domestic and external propaganda had been largely exhausted. Then, too, it is not inconceivable that some pressure for a settlement may have been brought to bear by Moscow, which, as will be shown shortly, wields a certain amount of leverage in P'yongyang. Finally, one can surmise that Kim Il-song may have been spurred to dispose of the whole affair before the advent in Washington of a new administration which P'yongyang feared might prove more intractable.

Between Peking and Moscow

The preceding survey of North Korea's major preoccupations clearly suggests that the ideological predilections of the P'yongyang regime are closer to those of Peking than to those of Moscow. The anomaly is, however, that North Korea currently enjoys warm and intimate relations with the Soviet Union, while maintaining correct relations at best with the People's Republic of China. The key to this apparent paradox is to be found in North Korea's intense national pride as well as its perceived national self-interest.

From 1962 to 1964, North Korea was unmistakably in the Chinese camp in both word and deed. However, it gained little and lost much by its pro-Peking stance. Above all, it was hard hit by Moscow's retaliatory suspension of economic and military assistance, which severely impeded North Korea's program of economic and military construction. At the same time, P'yongyang found the role of junior partner to a Peking regime afflicted with megalomania increasingly distasteful. Mao Tse-tung's immodest claim to be the fountainhead of revolutionary strategy and ideological orthodoxy not only for all Asian Communists but for Communists throughout the world deeply annoyed the independent-minded and narcissistic Kim Il-song. Moreover, Mao's refusal to join with the Soviet Union in a Communist united front against US "imperialist aggression" in Vietnam infuriated P'yongyang.[24] The upshot of all this was that no sooner had Khrushchev fallen from power than North Korea sought and achieved a rapprochement with the new Soviet leadership. This was, however, by no means symptomatic of an ideological reorientation on the part of the North Korean leadership. Its hard line remained intact. But to continue that hard line, it needed Soviet aid more than it needed Chinese friendship. And it was fed up with China's propensity to play the Big Brother.

By the same token, North Korea's renewed friendship with the Soviet Union did not signify its readiness to accept ideological subordination to Moscow. While avidly seeking and receiving huge Soviet assistance, P'yongyang nevertheless managed to stave off Soviet pressures for ideological conformity. Indeed, it loudly proclaimed its independence of both Peking and Moscow. In a widely publicized editorial of August 12, 1966, entitled, "Let Us Defend Our Independence," *Nodong Sinmun* insisted that there were neither superior nor inferior Communist parties, and that each party should be its own master. Similarly, in his main report to the KWP conference held two months later, Kim Il-song again reasserted North Korea's independent position in the Communist bloc. Both the editorial and Kim's speech contained thinly-veiled criticisms of Soviet revisionism and Chinese dogmatism alike.

Kim's lengthy policy address to the First Session of the Fourth Supreme People's Assembly on December 16, 1967, in which he outlined a new ten-point political program, was even more emphatic in its insistence on independence. The first and foremost objective of the DPRK was declared to be "to follow unswervingly the policy of political independence, economic self-reliance, and national self-defense." [25] As if to underscore its independent posture, the KWP refused to attend the Soviet-sponsored meeting of world Communist parties held in Budapest in February 1968—this despite the fact that the CPSU had dispatched Central Committee Secretary Boris N. Ponomarev to P'yongyang to persuade the KWP to participate.[26]

Against this background, the armed occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in August 1968 would seem to have confronted P'yongyang with a difficult choice. For if the North Korean leadership was so strongly committed as it professed to be to the principles of national independence and mutual non-

[24] For North Korea's indirect criticism of Peking on these scores, see 'Chajusong ul ongho haja" (Let Us Defend Our Independence), editorial, *Nodong Sinmun*, August 12, 1966; and Kim Il-song, "Hyon chongse wa uri tang ui kwaop," *loc. cit.*, pp. 12–24.

[25] *Nodong Sinmun*, Dec. 17, 1967.

[26] *Ibid.*, Feb. 10 and 11, 1968, and *New York Times*, Feb. 23 and 27, 1968.

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interference in internal affairs within the Communist orbit, it would logically have had to denounce the invasion. On the other hand, could it afford to alienate Moscow on such a crucial issue? And, more important, should its commitment to independence within the bloc override its natural antipathy toward any form of revisionism—and particularly the sort of revisionism that had manifested itself in Czechoslovakia?

The latter considerations apparently prevailed, for North Korea promptly endorsed the action of the Soviet Union and its allies, echoing Moscow's claim that the intervention had been undertaken at the invitation of "certain Czech party and government leaders" in order to stem the threat of counterrevolution within the country. The Dubcek leadership, declared *Nodong Sinmun*, had jettisoned the principles of proletarian dictatorship and class struggle and cast away the hard-won fruits of socialist revolution. Under the "phony pretext of democratization and liberalization," the paper added, Czechoslovakia had in effect degenerated into a tool of imperialism.[27] North Vietnam and Cuba echoed P'yongyang's (and Moscow's) views, while Communist China vehemently condemned the invasion as a "shameless act." [28]

The Road Ahead

In sum, North Korea has transformed itself within the span of two decades from a feeble Communist satellite into a militant nation vigorously asserting its independence and making a concerted effort to build up its economic and military power. Throughout its existence, the political reins have remained firmly in the grip of one man, Kim Il-song. Driven by an insatiable appetite for power and personal prestige, Kim has ruthlessly eliminated all opposition and made himself the center of a personality cult rivaling that of Mao. In the process, he has turned North Korea—a country once known for the rugged individualism of its people—into a nation of sycophants and obedient tools of an industrialization program whose rewards have thus far eluded them. Kim's burning ambition to reunify North and South and thus make himself the "leader of the 40 million Korean people" not just in name but in fact has resulted in North Korea's increasingly military orientation and militant posture. The ominous slogan, "Let Us Turn the Entire Country into a Fortress," is rapidly becoming a reality.

The crucial question is: Is Kim Il-song reckless enough to risk a new war? As recently as September 1968, he declared:

While the Korean people do not want war, neither do we fear it. If our enemies should provoke a war, the entire Korean people will rise up in a heroic struggle for the preservation of the fruits of socialism, for the complete liberation and unification of our fatherland, and for the protection of peace in Asia and in the world. We shall deal our enemies an exterminating blow.[29]

While these remarks do not sound like a harbinger of *unprovoked* war, Kim has clearly been preparing his people both physically and psychologically for eventual armed conflict—and if the Pueblo seizure and North Korean commando incursions into the South [30] were not outright provocations, they certainly constituted a dangerous kind of brinkmanship. But formidable as North Korea's military capacity has become, it still appears inadequate to sustain, let alone win, a war involving *both* ROK and US forces. In the final analysis, P'yongyang's warmaking power continues to be heavily dependent upon the Soviet Union, and as long as this is the case, Moscow seems likely to remain a significant restraining influence on P'yongyang's bellicosity.

To say this is not to preclude the possibility that North Korea may precipitate another grave international crisis à la Pueblo. Nor is P'yongyang likely to slacken its efforts to harass the South by means of guerrilla-type operations designed to undermine the South Korean government and create an eventual revolutionary situation. In short, Kim Il-song cannot be expected to relinquish his obsessive dream of conquering the South by one means or another. Given his relative youth and his tight control over the P'yongyang regime, his dream is likely to shape North Korea's behavior for some time to come.

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[27] See *Nodong Sinmun*, Aug. 22–23, 1968.
[28] *New York Times*, Aug. 23, 1968.

[29] *Nodong Sinmun*, Sept. 8, 1968. Kim made an almost identical statement in a speech marking the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army in February 1968. See *ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1968.

[30] Since the attempted commando raid of January 1968 on the presidential mansion in Seoul, North Korea has continued its guerrilla offensive against South Korea. The peak of violence was reached last November when a force of about 120 North Korean commandos landed by sea on South Korea's east coast. By the year's end, 107 infiltrators had been killed by South Korean police and military forces, five had been captured, and two others had surrendered voluntarily. In all, a total of 1,087 North Korean operatives attempted to infiltrate south of the DMZ during 1968. For details, see *Dong-A Ilbo* (Seoul) during November and December, 1968, and especially its issue of January 1, 1969.

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BOOKS

China Under Mao

WILLIAM HINTON: *Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village.*
New York, Monthly Review Press, 1966.
K. S. KAROL: *China: The Other Communism.* (Translated from French by Tom Baistow.)
New York, Hill and Wang, 1967.
JULES ROY: *Journey Through China.* (Translated from French by Francis Price.)
New York, Harper and Row, 1967.
JAMES R. TOWNSEND: *Political Participation in Communist China.*
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967.
A. DOAK BARNETT (with a contribution by EZRA VOGEL): *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China.*
New York, Columbia University Press, 1967.
FRANZ SCHURMANN: *Ideology and Organization in Communist China.*
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966.
THEODORE H. E. CHEN: *The Chinese Communist Regime: Documents and Commentary.*
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
A. DOAK BARNETT: *China After Mao.*
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967.

Reviewed by Richard L. Walker

UNTIL A DECADE AGO, developments in Communist China seemed at least somewhat amenable to rational and orderly analysis. The "New China" appeared to possess a high degree of unity in its political structure and ruling elite, and it projected an aura of optimism and confidence in the durability of its new order. Then, with the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958 and the subsequent economic chaos and political ferment which eventually erupted into the frenzy of Mao's "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (hereafter GPCR), the image of unity and solidity collapsed, and the difficulties facing outside observers of the Chinese scene—both Communist and non-Communist—multiplied enormously.

The problem of access to information about China (and indeed to China itself) has been a formidable one from the very outset of Mao's rule. The Chinese have traditionally placed emphasis on outward appearances, and the external facade of unity and harmony has often deterred foreigners from gaining insight into the actual facts of Chinese political power and policy struggles. Thus, despite early speculation in informed Chinese circles in Hong Kong and Taiwan about a hidden struggle between various factions and groupings within the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), most outside observers tended to discount this speculation and continued to think and write in terms of a monolithic Communist China. The serious internal antagonism toward the Communist regime revealed during the "Hundred Flowers" period in the spring of 1957 was quickly forgotten, and the picture of a cohesive and unified

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China under Mao continued to be projected to the world.

The "information gap" regarding mainland China has been magnified by the complexities of the Chinese language—which are formidable indeed, especially in combination with the jargon of Marxism-Leninism—and by Peking's fetish for secrecy. No meaningful statistics have been released for more than a decade, and the movement of even friendly foreign observers inside China has been increasingly curtailed. In addition, the wild diversity of charges and countercharges contained in the pamphlets, wall-posters, and periodicals of the GPCR period made it extremely difficult to sort out fact from fiction, to distinguish party from state issues, or to determine which trends were local and which national. Finally, the kaleidoscopic shuffling of personnel and organizations during the GPCR, which has been partially obscured by adherence to certain standard terms and institutional designations, has all but precluded any reliable understanding of the source or rationale of policy decisions.

It is necessary to call attention to these difficulties because they help to explain some of the limitations of recent literature dealing with institutions and trends in Communist China. At the same time, they lend added interest to the writings of those authors who are so bold as to attempt to shed new light on the complex mystery that is contemporary China. The volumes reviewed here fall, as usual, into two categories: those based on actual personal experience in mainland China under the Communists, and those written by outside analysts drawing on a wide range of sources.

IN THE FIRST CATEGORY is William Hinton's *Fanshen*, based on material gathered by the author during a six-month stay in a southern Shansi village in 1948 as an agricultural technician for the United Nations. Written in the style of a novel, the book is primarily interesting for the illumination it casts on the rural conditions in prerevolutionary China which were so effectively exploited by the Communists to win the enthusiastic support of the peasantry in their drive to power. After depicting the sufferings of the Chinese peasants of "Long Bow" Village in vivid detail, the book proceeds to give a full account of the Communist "liberation" of the village, the "land reform," and the final establishment of a "local People's Congress." To Hinton, who went out to China in 1948 full of idealism, the harsh realities of the Chinese peasants' life were heartrending, and the Communist solution inspired him no less than it did many others at the time. Thus his story exhibits the stark, black-*vs.*-white contrasts of a morality play. The landlords are all corrupt, deceitful, sadistic; the peasants, especially women, are all oppressed and abused; the officials of the old regime are all tyrants. Then comes a breath of new life with the advent of the Communists and the ensuing *fanshen* (literally, to turn the body or to turn about), or reform.

Hinton, who stayed on in China to continue his work under the Communists until 1953, mirrors the spirit which characterized the Maoist movement in the period immediately before and after the proclamation of the new People's Government. He was caught up in the euphoria of the Communist revolutionaries engaged in building a "new China." Like many of the young Chinese intellectuals, he saw the need for reform and felt the call to action, and he also grasped the crucial importance of China's agrarian problem. His description of the spiritual remolding of the young intellectuals—in part, obviously autobiographical—helps us understand not only the early sources of Communist strength, but also the dynamics of the later disillusionment of these same intellectuals with a panacea that did not pan out:

> **. . . those intellectuals who were changed by the process seemed to be grateful. The spartan life, the intellectual ferment, the group companionship, and the physical and mental well-being that developed as a result of remolding their ideology moved most of them deeply. They were exhilarated by the knowledge that they were drawing closer to the heart of the Revolution and were themselves undergoing an awakening. . . . When the call came to go to the villages, they went eagerly to do battle with all of the past that was rotten, corrupt, and painful (p. 268).**

The author does not shrink from acknowledging some of the early "leftist" excesses and mistakes, but in his own mind, as in those of the Communist revolutionary cadres, these could be condoned within the framework of a historically necessary class struggle. Hinton still carries with him the spirit of those early years of the Chinese Communist revolution, and one might only wish that the land reform he describes—which did indeed generate new forces and hopeful changes in the long-suffering Chinese countryside—had not been but a prelude to the inevitable collectivization that the Communist approach dictated. One wonders, however, whether Hinton, were he to return to Long Bow Village today (which is all but impossible under present conditions), would still feel the same enthusiasm for Communist-style agrarian reform.

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The agrarian problem remains acute in China, but one cannot generalize about that vast and diverse land in terms of the experience of one small village, nor is it possible to project to other underdeveloped countries the same land reform needs that confronted China. Nevertheless, Hinton believes that the agrarian question is crucial, and that his village study holds lessons which are still relevant for many areas of the world today:

The relevance of Long Bow's history to the present day can hardly be overemphasized. The story revolves around the land question. Without understanding the land question, one cannot understand the Revolution in China, and without understanding the Revolution in China, one cannot understand today's world (p. xii).

This may well be so—as far as it goes. But there would seem to be other areas of knowledge and experience that are equally important to an understanding of today's world, such as science and technology, modern totalitarianism, population explosion, and urbanization, to mention only a few. In sum, Mr. Hinton's book is both interesting and valuable for the light it sheds on a crucial contributing factor to the Communist victory in China, but it is clearly lacking in objectivity as well as in breadth of perspective.

ALSO IN THE CATEGORY of books based on personal observation, though quite different from Mr. Hinton's study, are K. S. Karol's *China: The Other Communism* and Jules Roy's *Journey Through China*. Both authors are French journalists who went to China without any particular background knowledge of Chinese affairs and spent only brief periods of time there—Karol four months in early 1965 and Roy two months in 1964. Both books suffer from the shortcomings common to this genre of hasty and necessarily superficial reporting about China, and both—at least as translated from the original French—abound in remarkable errors of fact and in the rendition of Chinese names.

We have, of course, had more than our share of books by four-month "experts" on Maoland, espe-

Reviewers in This Issue

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ROBERT CONQUEST—an established British poet as well as a writer on Soviet affairs; most recently author of *The Great Terror* (New York, Macmillan, 1968).

HAROLD SHUKMAN—Research Fellow at St. Anthony's College, Oxford University; author of *Lenin and the Russian Revolution* (New York, Putnam, 1967).

MAURICE FRIEDBERG—Director of the Russian and East European Institute at Indiana University (Bloomington); author of numerous studies on past and present Russian literature and on Soviet affairs.

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BERNARD RUDDEN—Professor at Oriel College, Oxford University; contributor to various European and American periodicals.

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cially during the first decade when the leadership was anxious to show off the "new China." But from 1961, when China began experiencing the calamitous aftereffects of the Great Leap, it became increasingly difficult for Westerners to gain access to that country, and even such superficial accounts by transient outside visitors became more rare. Then, in 1964, de Gaulle's establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking aroused hopes that at least the French would be allowed access to China and would be able to provide the world with reliable firsthand information on conditions there. The volumes by Karol and Roy are, however, a sad disappointment on this score, and now China's doors are even more tightly closed to outside observers than hitherto as a consequence of the GPCR.

Karol's visit to China, by invitation, grew out of conversations he had with Chou En-lai in Algiers in late 1963. He begins his book by noting, "Admittedly, I arrived in China prejudiced in their favor" (p. 3), and he proceeds to bear this out in the remaining pages. He uses his "guided" tour of the People's Republic as a framework for retelling the history of the Communist movement in China, but while he shows some signs of having delved into scholarly historical material on the subject, what emerges is a highly colored and inaccurate version that hews closely to the official party line. True, he presents this section under the heading, "Their History as They See It Today," and he concludes it with the admission that "if one day . . . the Chinese study their real history, they will be forced to modify several important points in the version they disseminate today" (p. 139). Yet the reader may well ask whether there is any real value in echoing, without correction, Peking's over-romanticized "rewrite" of the party's history, which can already be garnered from official Chinese Communist publications distributed abroad. Karol has sections on the countryside (in which he argues that the "communes were born relatively painlessly"), on the cities (in which he claims that "industries and services function well without recourse to material incentives"), on culture, and on foreign policy. The recurrent theme throughout is the idealism of the Chinese Communists as opposed to the cold cynicism of the Soviet leaders (Karol having been an able journalistic critic of the Soviet system over the years).

ROY'S VOLUME is vastly different in tone. Here again we find repeated much of the official Chinese Communist version of China's past, but Roy is a critical reporter willing to ask the blunt question (*e.g.*, Where does Chairman Mao Tse-tung live?). His travels in China were beset with the difficulties that face anyone hoping to avoid the usual guided-tour treatment, and his book is a sobering account of his personal disillusionment with People's China. In many instances his impressions are diametrically opposite to those of Karol. (Which are we to believe?) He found the mass enthusiasm oppressive and the uniformity of the official line suffocating. For this Gallic individualist, Peking was not at all the city of celestial beauty and light described by other tourists. But then he even disliked Chinese cuisine—a rare person! More significantly, Roy observes:

I had no need to wonder that people in Europe and America knew more about what was happening in China than I did in Peking. I discovered myself light-years removed from all that at home was the foundation of my love for men and life, and a kind of terror began to take possession of me (p. 25).

Roy's judgment about the greater reliability of outside information on Communist China seems to be confirmed by the remaining volumes under review, some of which make formidable contributions to our understanding of China under Communist rule. But before turning to these studies, it is perhaps worthwhile to emphasize two points that emerge with utmost clarity from the three disparate works discussed so far. First, there can be no question that China has undergone revolutionary changes under Communist leadership, notably in terms of the extension of official power into the smallest villages and in terms of industrialization, mobilization of human resources, and mass movements. Second, it is clear that the official ideology has penetrated into all aspects of life in a manner which has lent a new intensity and fanaticism to the politics and policies of Communist China.

JAMES R. TOWNSEND'S *Political Participation in Communist China* is a significant and valuable addition to the growing list of sophisticated political studies of mainland China. He has dug deeply into the official documentation and has placed the revolution of active popular participation in politics under the Communists within the framework of the whole process of social evolution in China in this century. His study makes plain that "political change in modern China has . . . been gradual and partial, rather than abrupt and total as the CCP and foreign observers sometimes suggest" (p. 213).

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The author begins his work with a summary of the extent of political participation in dynastic and Kuomintang China and then turns, in two clearly-organized chapters, to the development of Chinese Communist doctrines and practices designed to involve the populace in support of the party's goals. He examines both the functioning of the official organs of government and the manner in which the hierarchical structure of non-governmental mass organizations brings the individual Chinese into participation in the Communist-organized system. He does not, however, overestimate the importance of these national mass groupings. He observes:

> **". . . although the Chinese citizen's political education may cover almost any aspect of national and international politics and he may participate in state activities through ritualistic elections, congresses, and rallies, most of his political actions relate to affairs of small economic and social units that are not part of the formal government structure (p. 173).**

Townsend presents a good analysis of how the small grass-roots study groups in mainland China are related to concepts of party morality and linked to a process of political education which finds expression in the mass movements so characteristic of Chinese Communist rule. He suggests that there are four major factors behind the success of the Communist regime in achieving voluntary mass participation in politics: habitual Chinese obedience to authority; positive popular ideological support for the party's objectives, though not necessarily for the party itself; the desire to satisfy personal needs, particularly for advancement; and finally the effectiveness of the party's effort to identify itself with popular interests. On the other hand, he notes that the Communists have had to cope with (1) a low level of political consciousness based upon a "tradition of political apathy and ignorance," (2) the emergence of some measure of actual hostility to party objectives, (3) dissatisfaction with the Communist style of participation, and (4) a deterioration in the verve of small group discussions. On balance, however, his work provides convincing corroboration of "the CCP's accomplishments in organizing the masses for political activity" (p. 210).

This is not to say that Townsend's study represents the last word on the subject of political participation in Communist China. In the first place, he has drawn most of his material and evidence from the early years of the Communist regime, and in view of the increasingly arbitrary nature of Maoist rule in the last decade, it is difficult to accept his view that "generally the CCP does take its 'democratic' system seriously" (p. 77). Secondly, he tends to assume a monolithic Chinese Communist Party—an assumption which the revelations and events of the last few years have now proven largely mistaken—and to project even into the mid-1960's the same sort of popular enthusiasm which marked the first general elections of 1954, as described so well in his book. Thirdly, because he had to rely for the most part on official Chinese Communist documentation, his descriptions of political participation in China seem at times to share the shortcomings of an attempt to describe the same phenomenon in the Soviet Union of the late 1930's on the basis of the Stalin Constitution.

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS from Communist China have real limitations, but there are other sources of inside information on the Chinese state. In his *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China,* Professor Doak Barnett has drawn upon intensive interviewing of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong in order to piece together a description of the functioning of a national-level ministry in mainland China, of a *hsien* or county, and of a commune and a production brigade (although the identities of the units described are not specified in order to protect the informants). The study reflects a painstaking and competent job of organizing and reporting in detail the bits of information gleaned over months of intensive interrogation of the Chinese informants. This attention to careful organization and detail helps to bring clearly into focus many significant trends in the Chinese Communist regime; for example, the tendency towards a proliferation of bureaucratic structures, growing differentiations of rank and rank-consciousness, increasing lethargy among administrative cadres due to excessive paper work and constant supervision, and the ever more decisive role of the party—all of this, however, before the GPCR.

This volume is not intended to be absorbing reading and is probably most useful as a reference book on the structure and operation of the three levels of government described. (Also useful is the glossary of Chinese "bureaucratese" terms provided.) Doubtless through the informants, the book reflects the Chinese tendency to emphasize form, thus providing a detailed and elaborate wiring diagram of government operation in mainland China prior to the GPCR. Events in the past two years may have shattered the stability of the bureaucratic structures described; nevertheless, the book brings out some of the Chinese traits of formalism which

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may well persist and result in these structures' continuing to grind on. Indeed, Mao's current assault on the party bureaucracy in an attempt to recapture some of the original fervor reflected in Hinton's volume may become more understandable after one digests the material presented by Professor Barnett. On the other hand, readers of Barnett's diagrammatic study are likely to emerge from it still wondering how things *actually* worked. What about personality conflicts? Who knew whom? They are likely to ask whether the picture is not too static and dehumanized, too organized. On this score, however, the work is perhaps an important reflection of its subject.

INSOFAR AS BARNETT'S book documents Chinese Communist progress in bureaucratization, it is certainly at odds with Franz Schurmann's systematized study of Communist rule in China, which states in its "Prologue" that the attractions of the "Chinese model" lie in "organizing a poor backward country, holding it together, *preventing bureaucratization*, and achieving basic social changes" (p. xliv). One might also add that the GPCR seems to provide evidence of some formidable failures in organizing and holding together the vast land and disparate population of China.

In many respects, nevertheless, Schurmann's *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* is one of the most interesting and provocative interpretations of Chinese Communist rule to appear thus far in the West. The author is both sociologist and historian, and in addition to a prodigious ability to work through sources in many languages, his study reflects the traditional bent of German scholarship toward systematization through redefinition of terms (*e.g.*, Weber and Mannheim), acceptance of the Marxist class interpretation of Chinese society, and enthusiasm for Mao Tse-tung's attempt to build a whole new system in China.

Schurmann not only stresses the necessary interrelationship between ideology and organization in any system but carries this thesis to the extreme of asserting, for example, that "since there is no such thing as an organized worldwide Communist party, there is no such thing as a 'Communist ideology'" (p. 22). The Chinese Communists, he maintains, have combined a total conception of ideology (Marxism-Leninism) with a particular conception (the thought of Mao Tse-tung), and the resultant whole is an "ideology of organization." He lays proper stress on understanding communications within an ideologized system and explains how and why certain terms mean something different within the closed Chinese system than would normally appear to those interpreting them from the outside with benefit of translation:

> **A communications system requires common categories of thought and a common language. Once a communications system develops categories and language, it becomes closed because outsiders cannot understand the communications (p. 58).**

One might add, not unfairly, that this observation could be applied to Professor Schurmann's own book, for the author works within the framework of definitions of his own which this reviewer believes to be more related to the scheme being erected than to the reality of the Chinese scene.

After discussing the relationship between organization and ideology, Mr. Schurmann presents sections on the party and the formal government structure, followed by two chapters on management and control. He believes that the leaders in Peking have been moving toward a more unified and flexible system of management in industry, and that this system, though still fraught with tensions and paradoxes, is gradually resolving the dilemmas posed by bureaucracy and problems of policy *versus* operations. The chapter on control discusses the early aping of the Soviet Union under Stalin and the subsequent gradual changes that culminated in the abandonment of the Ministry of State Control in 1959. Schurmann discounts the role of the secret or political police in Communist China and dismisses the Social Affairs Department of the party altogether. Here again, this reviewer wonders about accuracy.

The final chapters deal with the activation of the Chinese Communist organizational blueprint in the cities and in the countryside. Had this volume been published in the early 1960's, one might have accepted the author's conclusion that China "politically and socially . . . has achieved a unity and undergone a transformation which are the foundations of its further technical and economic development" (p. 500). By 1968, however, the very Chinese Communist leaders whom Schurmann saw as among the world's greatest creators in the field of social engineering had made a shambles of much of his attempt to provide a rational structure for their efforts. The reader in 1969 will wonder why, if the Maoists had generally been doing as well as Schurmann believed them to be, the GPCR was necessary. Perhaps he, too, was misled by surface forms and—despite his enormous contribution to our understanding of the relationship of ideology to

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organization in Communist China—missed some vital elements. His book tells us little, for example, of the clashes of personalities and styles which the GPCR has now revealed to be critical in mainland China; indeed, Schurmann could write of "men loyal to the Mao-Liu mode of thinking" in the party secretariat (p. 144)—a phrasing which sounds downright silly today. Again, what of the ambitions of the military? Mainland China has not known real peace for more than a century and a quarter, and the ascent of the military to key positions of power, nationally and regionally, makes this a crucial factor in any analysis of organization there. Finally, though Schurmann seeks to elucidate the relationship of ideology to Chinese society, he can only do so by positing a unity and uniformity that would be questionable at best in a country of China's vast size and 700-million population—and the GPCR has not dealt kindly with that assumption.

ONE FACTOR played down by Schurmann, as by Karol and Townsend, is the Chinese tendency toward arbitrary rule or, as Mao's Soviet critics put it, "increasing violation of the elementary norms of socialist legality." If the Ninth Congress of the CCP should actually be held this year, as has been reported, it will still be more than twelve years since the Eighth Congress, which adopted a party constitution calling for a congress every five years. Similarly, the National People's Congress has been practically moribund for the past decade. Such facts are documented in Professor Theodore H. E. Chen's useful reference work, which contains 44 well-selected documents charting the course of the CPR, the organization of the government and party, economic policies, and the regime's goals of social revolution as projected from Peking. Chen provides an introductory commentary for each of the five groups of documents into which the work is divided, as well as an introduction surveying the first seventeen years of Chinese Communist rule. Were he writing today, the author could also include the CCP's new draft party constitution.

The final book under review is Professor Barnett's *China After Mao*, which attempts to analyze the forces that will continue to shape China's course after Chairman Mao passes from the scene. This small volume grew out of lectures delivered by the author in October 1966 and has been padded out with four documents, two of which are analyzed in the second of the three lectures. In fact, over a quarter of the second chapter consists of quotations from these two documents—the key passages anyway—so that the reader wonders whether the documents section was really necessary. The author's analysis itself is a neat summary of some of the problems faced by the Chinese leadership, of the Maoist prescriptions for continuing revolution in China and the world, and of the problem of succession.

Although the wide-ranging developments growing out of the GPCR have dated much of Barnett's discussion, his analysis nevertheless highlights some tendencies which will continue to be significant in mainland China. His presentation of Mao as a romantic revolutionary looking backwards to earlier formulas rather than forward to a changing world which he does not understand is especially good. The generation gap in mainland China is also well presented, though the array of statistics on the makeup of the Central Committee and Politburo is probably of little use today. Barnett wisely concludes:

It should be emphasized . . . that no one outside of Peking's inner circle can really know what present power relationships exist at the center of power in China, and furthermore the present situation could change, suddenly and rapidly (p. 113).

To which we might add that possibly not even Peking's inner circle knows what the power relationships are today, or what they may become tomorrow.

IT IS A CURIOUS fact that all eight of these books about China project an image of unity for that troubled land. Note that even the use of the word "China" seems to convey that unity. Then, too, the bureaucracy and the institutions created during the 1950's have been invested by outside observers with an exaggerated solidity and staying power. Like the Chinese Communist leaders themselves, foreign interpreters of China may perhaps be prone to see system where system may not actually exist. Today it is possible to see that powerful currents have been stirring beneath the surface of the structure. A number of these currents may yet prove more powerful than the organizational creations of Mao and his once unified top leadership.

A few of these forces deserve mention because one suspects that they will be subjects of concern in future literature on China. First, there is the accumulating evidence of a resurgence of Chinese ethnocentrism and the utilization of internal rather than international standards of measurement. Second, and linked to the first, is the persistence and in

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some instances the intensification of many traditional cultural values. In a way, the GPCR can be interpreted as Mao's hostile reaction to this. Third, there is the whole problem of regionalism and provincialism, augmented by the related problem of anti-Chinese attitudes among minority nationalities now numbering probably more than 40 million. And finally, there are the enormous problems of population pressure, resource distribution, marginal areas of cultivation, transport and communications.

Though each of these volumes in its own way makes some contribution to our understanding of the vastness and complexity of China, it is doubtful whether any of us—or even Chairman Mao himself—has answers to the problems which will confront the leadership of mainland China in the years ahead. On the basis of the information offered by these seven "China-watchers" and the developments since the publication of their findings, it may be legitimate to wonder whether the land is not just too diverse, and its population too vast, to be effectively run as a modern state from a single center.

Revolution and Aftermath

WALTER LAQUEUR: *The Fate of the Revolution: Interpretations of Soviet History.*
New York, Macmillan, 1967.
The Impact of the Russian Revolution, 1917–1967.
(Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.)
London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1967.
RICHARD PIPES, ED.: *Revolutionary Russia. A Symposium.*
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968.

Reviewed by John Lukacs

THESE THREE BOOKS are fairly representative of the large number of commemorative works brought out in the English-speaking world on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The first is an interpretive essay by the eminent Sovietologist and contemporary historian, Mr. Walter Laqueur. Its title, *The Fate of the Revolution,* is a somewhat misleading one, however, for the book deals not so much with the fate of the revolution as with the fate of the revolution's successive and varied historical interpretations: it is an interpretation of interpretations. The historiography of a subject may, of course, be an excellent introduction to the history of the subject itself. Yet this is perhaps less true for the history of Soviet Russia than for many other contemporary subjects.

One of the difficulties of interpreting Soviet history through its historiography lies in the fact that for a long time the most assiduous students of the Soviet Union were journalists and political scientists rather than historians. These limitations are reflected in Mr. Laqueur's careful and readable book, which is in essence a concatenation of essays beginning with a cautiously low-key record of some of the nonsense written by eminent Westerners (including certain historians) during the first three decades of Soviet history. From this relatively short chapter, entitled (somewhat grandiloquently) "Russia and the West," the author goes on to discuss the growth of Soviet studies in the West—Lenin (For and Against); Stalin (For and Against). A separate chapter is devoted to the work of British historian

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E. H. Carr, and the volume ends with a survey of Soviet historians. It is somewhat surprising that Mr. Laqueur chooses to ignore some of the most remarkable contributions by non-Soviet Russian historians: for example, Melgunov's classic study of Petrograd in October 1917, which is not mentioned, and the important work of George Katkov, which is mentioned hardly at all.

By and large, Mr. Laqueur's treatment of Soviet historiography reflects the bland consensus which seems generally characteristic of Anglo-American Sovietology at the moment—a matter to which I shall have occasion to return at the end of this review. There are also some odd omissions (the author, for example, has much to say about Isaac Deutscher but hardly a word about George Kennan), although this is to some extent understandable in view of the author's method of treating his subject by means of a number of connected essays. A serious and comprehensive study of the historical literature—as distinct from a mere historical bibliography—concerning the Soviet Union remains, at least in the opinion of this reviewer, one of the principal desiderata in the field of contemporary Russian and European history.

THE VOLUME SPONSORED by the Royal Institute of International Affairs is likewise restricted in scope, consisting of five long (and not too closely connected) essays dealing with the influence of Bolshevism on the world *outside* Russia. Within these limitations, however, this is one of the more interesting and durable contributions to the historical literature of the Russian Revolution at the present moment of retrospect. Arnold Toynbee's introductory essay is unexceptionable and is followed by a thoughtful as well as readable paper by Neil McInnes focussing on the labor movement. "Fifty years after the Bolshevik Revolution," begins McInnes, "the influence of that event on Western socialism seems largely spent"; and he proceeds to substantiate his thesis in the best—and nowadays, alas, only too rare—tradition of imaginative scholarship. Still, perhaps the most valuable portions of this essay deal not so much with the failure of the Russian "model" in influencing others as with the crumbling of the ideas and dynamism of the Western socialist movements themselves.

Turning to the other contributions to this volume, Hugh Seton-Watson's on "Nationalism and Imperialism" tells us little that is new, although the best portions of his paper do shed light on Bolshevism's impact in Eastern Europe, which is of course the author's special area of competence. Peter Wiles' essay on the impact of Communist economic dogmas and models is somewhat disjointed and includes some rather curious journalistic *aperçus* ("e.g., . . . the Titoists are the best ideological salesmen in the world. They have in particular understood that the salesman's best ploy is the trip round the works . . ."). Mr. Wiles also digresses to deal with Western influence on the USSR, but his treatment is short and not very adequate. Richard Lowenthal's essay, entitled "The Model of the Totalitarian State," is essentially a comparative treatment of various 20th-century dictatorships—unexceptionable when the author deals with the Soviet model, but somewhat more questionable when he makes cursory generalizations about Fascism and National Socialism.

WHEREAS THE Royal Institute's compilation of essays may be of particular value for the general reader or for undergraduates, the symposium *Revolutionary Russia,* edited by Professor Richard Pipes of Harvard University, is likely to be of greater interest to specialists. More detailed and penetrating than the Chatham House publication, the Harvard symposium consists of thirteen papers, supplemented by thirteen comments and thirteen discussions, all by eminent Sovietologists. Obviously it would be impossible in a brief review to comment on all thirty-nine of these items individually.

Let me say, therefore, that the chief value of the symposium rests in certain contributions by specialists, outstanding among them the paper by John Keep dealing with the difficult and neglected subject of "October in the Provinces." On the other hand, the commentaries of Isaiah Berlin, Bertram D. Wolfe, and Hannah Arendt are often platitudinous. As one read this compilation, one gets the very definite impression that the contributions of historians working in the Soviet field are, in general, far more interesting than those of authorities specializing in the political "philosophy" or the political "science" of revolutions. Yet this reviewer cannot forego mentioning his disappointment with E. H. Carr's general essay on "Marx, Lenin, Stalin," devoid as it is of the mark of scepticism and vigorous, independent thinking that has habitually distinguished this author. Indeed, the principal ideas expressed in it seem to suggest the tiredness not only of the author but also, perhaps, of his convictions. "Leninism," writes Carr, for example, "is Marxism of the epoch no longer of objective and

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inexorable economic laws, but of the conscious ordering of economic and social processes for desired ends." Yes, of course.[1] Or again: "But so long as man is interested to explore his past, nobody will doubt the credentials of the Russian Revolution as one of the great turning points in his history." Henry L. Roberts, apparently overawed by Carr's credentials, found this paper "particularly challenging and difficult"; however, some readers may find it outdated and boring.

THOUGH DIFFERING in focus, these three books obviously have certain things in common. They deal, in one way or another, with aspects of the same vast subject, and in large degree they reflect, often unwittingly, the prevailing climate of opinion about the Soviet Union in respectable circles of the English-speaking academic world. Let me therefore sum up, at the risk of imprecise generalization, certain widely-held assumptions that form the main features of this climate of academic opinion. According to these assumptions, the collapse of the old order in Russia in 1917 was practically inevitable, and this explains much of the success of the Bolsheviks, although the latter could not have triumphed without Lenin's inflexible and dynamic dedication to revolution. Further, the Soviets, undoubtedly at a cost horrendous to the liberal West, succeeded in transforming Russia into a vast industrial superpower. And finally, notwithstanding the supposedly fatal weaknesses and the transformations of Communist doctrine, the Soviet revolution has furnished the principal inspiration for potentially revolutionary elements among the underdeveloped and formerly colonial peoples of the world.

There is not much one can quarrel with in these assumptions of the general academic consensus, except perhaps to remark that, as is true of many a consensus, the areas of agreement may be widespread but are not always very profound. The evolution of the Soviet Union may or may not have been predictable, but the evolution of Soviet studies in the Western world has become, alas, all too predictable. By this I mean that the general line of published scholarship has, by and large, followed the evolution of the general political and social ideas prevalent among the elite of the Western meritocracy; that it has conformed—more or less unwittingly in the case of the better minds—to the general climate of instructed opinion.

Yet is it not true that the best kind of scholarship has usually been distinguished by its independence and its unclassifiability? And I mean not so much its independence from politics as something more profound—namely, the independence (and therefore the occasional unpredictability) of its interests. Now I would not disagree with Laqueur's statement that during the last two decades not only the quality but also the quantity of Soviet studies in the Western world have shown great advances. Yet it is at least arguable that the best of the historical and political studies of the Soviet Union produced in Germany in the 1920's may have been superior in insight, and perhaps even in the apparatus of scholarship, to much of the recent Anglo-American output. There are, to be sure, some respectable exceptions to this general observation. Still, the culture and information "explosions" of our times have not contributed much toward an increasing independence and variety of scholarship; rather, the contrary. This is indeed an enormous problem, the portents of which range beyond the field of Sovietology.

[1] This is one of those "Interchangeable Generalities" in which the works of contemporary social scientists—but not those of the earlier Carr—abound. Application: "Wallaceism is Hitlerism of the epoch no longer of objective and inexorable biological laws, but of the conscious ordering of biological and racial processes for desired ends." Etc., etc.

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A Degenerate Dynasty

MICHEL TATU: *Power in the Kremlin.*
(Translated from French by Helen Katel.)
New York, Viking Press, 1968.

Reviewed by Robert Conquest

TO SAY THAT THIS is the best political history of the USSR in the 1960's is not to pay much of a compliment, since there are no others that rate the label. But in addition to being unique, *Power in the Kremlin* is in itself a work of the highest excellence—a fact that does not have to be validated by comparison.

It is, of course, true, as Mr. Tatu says, that more information will eventually be forthcoming. As he puts it, "this reconstruction is only tentative. Some day, we may hope, archives will be opened—those of the Politburo and the Central Committee. The classic methods of historiography can then be applied and the present author for one will be delighted." For the forseeable future, however, the "Kremlinological" method is surely the only way of approaching the problem of the relation between power and policy in the Soviet state. "At present," Mr. Tatu remarks, "there is in fact no other way of understanding what is going on in the centers of Soviet power;" indeed, he adds, the term Kremlinology" is in itself "an unconscious tribute" to the method of detection, interpretation and deduction on which researchers must rely.

Mr. Tatu has both of the qualities required for the task. On the one hand he has patiently sought out the fine detail of evidence. But, even more important, he has handled it with the skill and judgement, the open-minded boldness and the equally necessary refusal to jump to premature conclusions which mark the real master.

It was time we had such a history. It was also time we were reminded once again of the dominating role of power in Soviet politics. In the author's words: "Experience has in fact shown that the importance of objective problems frequently depends on their relevance to power relationships." To compare Tatu's account with the majority of the works written during the Khrushchev period, which were based so frequently on the assumption that the First Secretary was in full control and meeting with no opposition (apart from a certain amount of friendly criticism on the part of his colleagues) is almost like comparing two different countries or epochs.

In the international sphere, the author gives extraordinarily profound and perceptive accounts of the U-2 crisis and of the more important Cuban confrontation of October 1962. Indeed, there is scarcely an area in which he does not contribute illuminatingly to our knowledge. He shows clearly that—contrary to the analyses of so many experts—the CPSU Central Committee did *not* play a decisive role either in the 1957 or in the 1964 crisis. He convincingly disentangles some of the problems which have puzzled all of us in connection with the succession of leaders of the Leningrad party organization, as well as of the Ukrainian CP. In the absence of other information, one has always been inclined to view the Leningrad apparat (for example) as a group of loyal Kozlov followers, or at least of people holding similar views on crucial problems such as destalinization. We should be grateful to Mr. Tatu for disabusing us of this rather superfi-

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cial notion, and for demonstrating that the sequence Kozlov, Spiridonov, Tolstikov, represents a formal but not a factional continuity.

Mr. Tatu has observed the substance, not the formalities, of scholarship. He has not cluttered up his book with references, but it is almost always clear from the narrative where to turn for additional data or analysis. I might note, parenthetically, that the question of "scholarship" is a much muddled one. For instance, in an otherwise exceedingly amiable review in *The New Leader* (Dec. 2, 1968) of my own last book, *The Great Terror,* Professor Richard Pipes remarked that although in the book the purge had "come alive" under my apparently amateur pen "in a way that it does not in academic studies of totalitarianism," I had tended "to neglect the analytic." That is to say, though I had indeed traced the origins of the Terror to the nature of the one-party state set up by Lenin, and had gone at some length into the peculiarities of the Communist mentality and motivations, I had not formally established nor asserted the inevitability of the Stalinist terror. Even the couple of thousand references contained in my study were not enough to give me professional status. But to avoid drawing definite conclusions when the material neither imposes them nor suggests them seems to me to be the true historical method—indeed the true "scientific" method.

Nor is this the only field where a certain decadence in current notions needs to be remedied by a good deal of backpeddling. If one had to point to one central fault in modern academic attitudes, it is surely the attempt to import into areas where they are not suitable the discipline of the physical sciences, or the abstract generality of philosophy. As a result, we are beset with pretentious pseudo-sciences, or at best premature sciences (in the fields of sociology, psychology and literary criticism in particular), where a more modest and tentative approach might provide real insights.

THE PERIOD THAT Tatu covers—at least after the fall of Khrushchev—is in one way less interesting than earlier times. The degeneration of the Soviet ruling caste has reached the stage in which there are no longer powerful personalities with definite attitudes and programs, but third-rate, short-view, hidebound petty bureaucrats, concerned only about how best to enjoy the fruits of office. That even these third-raters can here for the first time be seen in a genuine political perspective, in their tensions and disputes, is a major achievement of the author's.

The conclusion that seems to arise from the whole Khrushchev interlude is that no ruler can reform Russia, even in a fairly mild use of the word, unless he can crush the old-line apparat. Khrushchev made some progress in his direction, but not enough. His schemes went far enough to irritate, but not far enough to subdue the *apparatchiki.* Mr. Tatu shows in detail how these tactics led to the First Secretary's fall.

In the present circumstances, one looks to the even slightly more intelligent members of the Politburo in the hope that one or another of them may attempt (or be forced) to defend himself and fight for power by once again turning to the weapon of anti-Stalinism. There have lately been a few bare hints that something of the sort may be in the wind —*e.g.,* the anomalous revival in Estonian Communist organs of attacks on the otherwise banned "period of the personality cult" and insistence on the "collegiality" of the Secretariat. This could hardly happen without encouragement of some faction at the center. Thus far, to be sure, it is only the merest catspaw of a wind hardly stirring the sluggish surface of the Soviet political waters. In the long run, however, progress can come only with some contender for power using anti-Stalinism against his opponents, as Khrushchev did against the "anti-party group" in 1957.

It may be argued, of course, that (unless as a result of a complete breakdown of authority) genuine reforms in Russia can be carried out only by an autocrat like Peter the Great or Alexander II, able to face down the opposition of his own ruling class. However that may be, the country is now stuck in a situation in which revolutionary change is called for by all the social, economic and intellectual forces, and opposed and abated only by a political machine specially constructed for the purpose. It is a highly artificial situation, resembling that of Mr. Waldemar in Poe's story. On the whole, Mr. Tatu expects an eventual liberalization of the Soviet system and the emergence of a true parliamentary form of government. In the foreseeable future, he thinks the country will experience various swings, including a possible reversion to one-man distatorship and even police *coups* and military *coups:* "things are probably doomed to get worse before they get better." The one thing he believes certain is that the rule of the current morocrats is "drawing to an end." This book is more of a monument than they deserve, but it is indispensable to anyone wishing to understand contemporary Soviet history.

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Reviews in Brief

West vs. East

LEONARD SCHAPIRO: *Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century Political Thought.* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967.

THIS BRIEF, penetrating, and lucidly composed study is a revised and extended version of a series of lectures given by Professor Schapiro at Yale University in 1965. It is concerned with the two dominant strains—familiarly designated Westernism and Slavophilism—that can be traced throughout the history of Russian political thought since the early 19th century; here they are treated with greater accuracy and clarity under the headings Rationalism and Nationalism. The title implies more than a mere presentation of the parallel paths of these two schools of thought or of their confrontation. The case which Professor Schapiro argues, with a mastery of both political science and jurisprudence, is that the traditional demarcation of Russian thought is imperfect: the antagonists are not in fact saying what we would have them say in order that we may fit them more conveniently into our simple categories.

Thus, while the hallmark of rationalism was the belief that Russia's increasingly turbulent path was in no way different from that already or yet to be trodden by any other nation, and that the constitutional democracies of Western Europe stood as models for her development, we nonetheless find that there were rationalist thinkers who did not believe either that a democratic future could be assured only by revolution, or that Russian indigenous institutions were necessarily a hindrance to progress.

This kind of thinking left room for peasant traditions, the *mir*, the commune, and even preserved a role for the autocracy. Hertzen looked to the commune to help Russia into the socialist Utopia, while for Lenin the machinery of the centralistic autocracy must be seized and made to achieve the same end.

Professor Schapiro sheds light on an element which the old dichotomy has missed, namely the "nationalist." The nationalists believed that reforms could not be successfully planned in the abstract as some kind of universal blueprint for all societies, which would be typical of the rationalists. According to the nationalists, it was essential to take into account the customs, traditions, and attitudes of the nation, to build on that foundation and thus achieve progressive change which would be in harmony with the character of the people. Polycentrism is the analogy of this view for the Communist world today.

This book does much to correct the belief that Russian political thinking was above all dogmatic by showing that heterodox views were always to be found within the two main camps of revolutionaries and evolutionaries. Just as the constitutionalist Decembrists could harbor a Jacobin Pestel, and the determinist Marxists a Lenin fearful of missing an opportunity to make the revolution, so among the conservative and evolutionary-minded we find Boris Chicherin, who saw the cause of freedom and progress not as a struggle between the forces of darkness and light, but as a clash between what was rationally desirable and nationally possible. Professor Schapiro shows that in time a bogus version of this synthesis became the refuge of entrenched reactionary opinion, which espoused reform and even modified constitutionalism merely to guard against the more frightening changes promised by the forces of revolution.

Of special interest—against this background of protest and reaction—is the imperturbable role of the monarch, sustained by the ancient doctrine of autocracy and the outlook of the Orthodox Church, which preached love, virtue and trust, and which suspected intellectual inquiry as a corrupting influence of the heretical West. The role of the monarch served largely to widen the rift in opinion during the era of greatest social and economic change at the end of the 19th century and to crystallize that rift when compromise and adaptation were most needed. As the author comments in a footnote, "Had Nicholas and the party leaders shown more imagination, flexibility, foresight, and political skill than, in the event, they did, the revolution [of 1905] could obviously have been avoided." What we learn from this deeply informative book is that these were the very characteristics least likely to thrive in a society accustomed to divinely appointed rulers whose minds were seemingly changeable only by the violent means of mass revolt.

Harold Shukman

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Who's Who

EDWARD L. CROWLEY, ANDREW J. LEBED, and HEINRICH E. SCHULTZ, EDS.: *Prominent Personalities in the USSR*. Compiled by the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Germany. Metuchen, N. J., The Scarecrow Press, 1968.

SEVERAL YEARS AGO, in the American film comedy *Silk Stockings* (an updated version of *Ninotchka*), a Soviet bureaucrat newly appointed to a high post buzzed for his secretary and said, "bring me the book *Who Is Still Who*." Of course, anyone engaged in Soviet studies is fully aware that this is easier said than done. There is no Soviet equivalent of *Who's Who* or of the innumerable specialized biographic directories that are to be found in the West. Standard Soviet encyclopedias and reference works are of little help, since, as a rule, they list only the truly major (or favored) men and women in different areas of activity and—what is worse—suppress episodes in their careers which the editors or the subjects themselves would prefer to forget.

Prominent Personalities in the USSR thus has no Soviet competition. Prepared by the staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich and New York, this massive biographic directory of eight hundred large pages contains over six thousand entries covering Soviet citizens prominent in every field of endeavor. A unique and, one must add, surprising feature of the volume is that its editors—most of them Russian émigrés—have succeeded in enlisting the help of many of the Soviet biographees themselves. Even some party officials, the editors assure us, "have cooperated in correcting and supplementing the information offered about themselves; this cooperation has considerably facilitated the task of the Institute research staff."

Normally each entry includes reasonably detailed information about the individual's career and an extensive list of his publications, if any. It is gratifying that their titles are given in the original Russian, with English translations supplied in parentheses. Unlike many directories of Western personalities, this volume provides no information on the biographee's marital status, children, *etc.*, but then, as every newsman stationed in Moscow knows only too well, the private lives of men in Soviet public life are shrouded in secrecy. Nevertheless, in a number of cases one finds home addresses and even telephone numbers.

A spot check of nearly one hundred entries revealed no major factual inaccuracies, although the English translations of some Russian book titles contained a number of rather amusing errors (*e.g.*, the staid medieval *Primary Chronicle* received a much livelier title, *A Tale of Fleeting Years*, and Kaverin's Biblical *Seven Pairs of the Unclean* was, intriguingly, transformed into *Seven Dishonest Couples*).

All in all, *Prominent Personalities in the USSR* should prove a boon to scholars and journalists alike as a handy and reliable reference work. One welcomes the promise of the editors to bring out updated versions of the book every other year and quarterly supplements to bridge the interval between complete editions.

Maurice Friedberg

Soviet Science

GEORGE FISCHER, ED.: *Science and Ideology in Soviet Society*. New York, Atherton Press, 1967.

LOREN R. GRAHAM: *The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927–1932*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967.

THE RELATIONSHIPS between politics and science in contemporary society turn out to be even more complex than is generally supposed. The notion that science flourishes only under conditions of freedom stands challenged, if not refuted, by the evidence of the Soviet case. The well-known disasters of injecting irrelevant dogma into the scientific process—the Lysenko episode is usually cited—are real enough, yet the Soviet Union has also created an enormously successful scientific establishment. Clearly, commonsense generalizations provide no reliable indication of how Soviet politics and science interact, and thus we need careful studies of what actually happens.

Here are two fine books which precisely meet that need. Loren R. Graham deals with the Soviet Academy of Sciences during the critical years—1927 to 1932—of its takeover by the Communist Party. George Fischer and his collaborators (Richard T. de George, Loren R. Graham, and Herbert S. Levine) focus on current developments in sociology, philosophy, cybernetics, and mathematical and computer applications to economics, respectively.

Mr. Graham's volume will undoubtedly become a standard reference on his subject (it also includes a concise history of the Academy in its prerevolutionary and early postrevolutionary development), and those interested in the minutiae of organizational charts and the changing casts of scientists and organizers will find plenty to keep them busy. But all this is prologue to a more important question: how did Soviet science and scholarship manage to survive the onslaught? In part, as we know, they did not. During the period under discussion, some disciplines and some scientists suffered more than others, and the worst was to come later in the 1930's. Yet many did survive, and Mr. Graham suggests by way of explanation that "the negative effects of political controls in science are more selective than popular opinion usually admits. Science is not shattered by a few blows. Like an injured plant it grows around its wounds, seeks other paths to its goals, and continues its development so long as it can find minimum sustenance." In addition, of course, Soviet material support of many aspects of science has amounted to more than "minimum sustenance," and at times has even been lavish. Mr. Graham offers keen insights into the durability of Soviet science, and his careful documentation will encourage ambitious readers to investigate this phenomenon more closely.

The Soviet scientific community is currently making serious efforts to cast off the most damaging vestiges of Stalinist dogmatism and, at the same time, to adjust to the regime's increasingly subtle demands for scientific assistance under conditions of growing social and economic complexity. The Fischer anthology suggests that in the policy sciences the results of this reorientation are mixed, but he rightly emphasizes that the "encounter of science with ideology need not always result in conflict. . . . Soviet science . . . may in fact help to sustain the established system and its ideology rather than weaken or erode them."

This does not mean that the encounter is always successful or that all

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policy sciences receive adequate (or uniform) encouragement. In computer applications, the first hopes have been disappointed by inadequacies in hardware and programs; and in philosophy "many of the laws necessary for holistic planning are missing." Cybernetics, while contributing to a "renewed belief in man's ability to control intricate processes," has already proven something of a disappointment; and although the legitimation for sociology is firmly established, its sphere of application is still quite restricted. Indeed, if the Soviets are allowing increased experimentation in the hope of coming up with reliable scientific answers as to how to run a society from the center, then I suspect that they are bound to be disenchanted in the long run. If Western experience is a guide, the usefulness of the policy sciences, even where they are hospitably regarded, will most likely lie in making rather low-level empirical generalizations. That in itself is no small accomplishment, but one which hardly amounts to a comprehensive science of society. Therein lies, I think, one explanation of why there is no inevitable collision between ideology and the policy sciences in the USSR today: the actual achievements of the policy sciences are still so limited (and not only in the Soviet Union), and their recommendations so feeble or ambiguous, that they simply do not compete persuasively with the world view of an established ideology. Soviet planners will probably get far less than they expect from these new ventures, but then they have less to fear from them than they realize.

Allen Kassof

Soviet Law

WAYNE R. LAFAVE, Ed.: *Law in the Soviet Society*. Urbana, Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1965.

THE ESSAYS collected in this volume appeared originally in 1964 as a symposium on Soviet law in the journal *Law Forum*, published by the University of Illinois. Their republication is to be welcomed, for they certainly deserve a wide readership. The book contains an introductory survey of Western research (by Dimitri B. Shimkin); essays on Civil Procedure (Dennis M. O'Connor), on the Press (Bernard A. Ramundo), on Plan and Contract Performance (Dietrich A. Loeber), on Consumer Goods (Zigurds L. Zile), on the use of Soviet legal principles in other countries (John M. Hazard); and an annotation of new tort principles (Whitmore Gray).

All the contributors have something new to say, but if any one essay is to be singled out, it should be the one on consumer goods by Mr. Zile. Despite his initial avowal of timidity in the face of so vast a problem, he provides a vigorous, lucid, and quite original analysis of the stresses created by the present drive to raise the living standards of the Soviet people. He first shows how the regime's approach is weakened by uncertainty as to the future importance of private goods in a society which is building communism, and then describes the structure of trade. He gives some striking examples of black marketeering, including the means used by citizens to overcome the 1961 prohibition of private sales of automobiles, though he does not mention the fact that obvious evasion—by means of a phoney deed of gift—has been forestalled by forbidding notaries to register such documents except in favor of the donor's family. Methods of "advertising" and financing are explained, and there is also a fine account of the protection given by law to the buyer of shoddy goods. The Civil Code places the liability on the dealer, but Mr. Zile shows how often this is eroded by administrative direction within particular industries. Hopefully, he will find time in the future to examine the problem of personal injuries, for the more sophisticated the goods produced—especially in the area of "consumer durables"—the more dangerous any defects will be. In common-law countries, the dealer's strict liability in this matter has been supplemented by a tendency (much more articulate in the USA than in England) to impose the same high standard upon the manufacturer. As the Soviet retailer is usually a state organ, and so not threatened by insolvency, this development will presumably not be necessary; however, if someone other than the purchaser is hurt, the courts will have to choose between giving him a remedy against the dealer as a third party to the contract (as in France), or allowing him to sue the maker in tort.

The other essays included in the volume display similarly high standards of objective scholarship. Unlike many similar publications, these essays are based on a close study of original sources. One final note: it is no service either to the authors or the reader to issue the book without an index.

Bernard Rudden

Soviet Agriculture

KARL-EUGEN WÄDEKIN: *Privatproduzenten in der sowjetischen Landwirtschaft* (Private Producers in Soviet Agriculture). Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1967.

DR. WÄDEKIN'S BOOK is a major piece of research on the private sector of Soviet agriculture, a subject which, though profoundly affecting the well-being of a large segment of the population and of great relevance to any evaluation of agricultural developments and prospects in the USSR, has thus far not been treated exhaustively in the West.

The author has based his study of the Soviet countryside on a wide variety of original Soviet sources; indeed, this is the first time that contemporary Soviet literature in this field has been drawn on so extensively and to such advantage. Additional information has been gathered from studies published in English, German, and French, and the result is a book which will probably long remain a standard work and one which will be of interest not only to economists, sociologists, and political scientists, but also to laymen following developments in the Soviet Union.

Dr. Wädekin has taken a broad approach to his subject. He describes the legal and economic bases for the existence of subsidiary (*i.e.*, private) farming by members of collective farms, state farm workers, and other population groups. As he discusses the role of such farming in the production as well as marketing of individual agricultural products, he traces the changes in official policy toward such activities. For the most part, his book deals with the period 1950–65.

Two chapters discuss the interrelationship between the private and social-

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ized sectors of Soviet agriculture. The author correctly emphasizes that the subsidiary economy depends to a significant extent upon the socialized sector, and that the latter could hardly function without the former. All too often the Western press has stressed the private sector's impressive contribution to the country's total supply of animal products without mentioning that most of the feed required to make this contribution possible comes from the socialized sector. On the other hand, most collectives, if they could not count on the food and cash which their members earn from private plots, would be hard put to provide them even a bare subsistence without drastically reducing collective marketing and investment capabilities.

Soviet statistical coverage of important aspects of private farming is conspicuously incomplete. Western scholars are thus faced with the choice of embarking upon an extremely time-consuming estimating venture in an effort to provide the missing data or of making the best possible use of published statistics. The author has chosen the second alternative, compiling most of his statistical tables from official yearbooks.

While there are no published statistical series covering such a salient aspect of private farming as its contribution to total farm output, indirect official information—provided it is accurate—makes it possible to arrive at reliable estimates. For 1965, the most recent year dealt with in this volume, such indirect data indicated that the private sector accounted for 32 per cent of total gross output. In the opinion of the author, shared by the reviewer, this figure is too high, as are the corresponding figures for the few earlier years for which indirect information is available. One of the book's appendices is devoted to discussing this particular problem.

This reviewer benefited from and enjoyed the extensive excerpts from Soviet sources, especially since some of the material cited is not readily available. There may, however, be others who might feel that at times these excerpts interrupt the flow of the narrative and might argue in favor of briefer, if not fewer, quotations in the body of the text.

It is hoped that an English translation will soon follow and thus make Dr. Wädekin's findings regarding this important segment of Soviet life more accessible to English-speaking scholars. The addition of a subject index would add to the book's usefulness.

Luba O. Richter

Soviet Education

HERBERT C. RUDMAN: *The School and the State in the USSR*. New York, Macmillan, 1967.

IT IS A COMMONPLACE to point out that the true nature of a state is revealed in its schools. *What* the schools teach, *who* is taught, and (most important) *how* the state controls its educational system goes to the heart of what the state's politics are really about. Thus it follows that for any student of Soviet society the question of the relationship between the school and the state is of top-rank importance.

It is to this question that Dr. Rudman, Professor of Administration and Higher Education at Michigan State University, has addressed himself. Unfortunately, however, the results of his study are disappointing. Its merits are vitiated by a host of factual inaccuracies, highly questionable and confusing interpretations, carelessness in transliteration, and many hair-raising stylistic solecisms. To be sure, the book is not wholly without merits. It includes many excellent charts of the administrative structure of Gosplan organizations, education ministries, educational institutions, and trade unions. The author, who led an official United States research team to the Soviet Union, was able to secure quite detailed information about many aspects of school operation in the cities of Moscow and Minsk and in the Moskovoretskii school district of Moscow in particular. The system of in-service training for the upgrading of teachers is of great interest, lucidly explained, and well-documented. So is the operation of the important "Councils of Aid" attached to many school districts and charged with stimulating the educational work of teachers, pupils, parents, and local enterprises. The author deals well, too, with the duties and functions of school inspectors, upon whom falls the primary burden of controlling the work of the schools. The opening chapters outlining the structure of Soviet government, including the educational and economic planning bodies, are generally clear, comprehensive, and workmanlike.

Yet the faults of *The School and the State in the USSR* are so numerous that to list them in full would make tedious reading. Chapters 3 and 5 are particularly poor. Chapter 3 is entitled "The Economics of Public Education in the USSR," but in fact deals with the financing of education and does so most unsatisfactorily. The author's figure of 239 rubles for the average annual expenditure per pupil in school—to cite only one example of many—is most inaccurate; the true figure is less than half that amount. Chapter 5 on the "Institutions of Higher Learning"—or VUZy—is very spotty in its coverage and fails to provide any real insight into the administration of higher education. There is no mention of the developing trend toward greater university autonomy, reinforced to an important degree by the relatively independent funds that VUZy are receiving for research and development work commissioned by industry and by certain ministries. These funds are not directly allocated by the central planning authorities. Moreover, it is something of a triumph to write a book entitled *The School and the State in the USSR* and not once mention the influence of *Uchitelskaia gazeta* (Teachers' Newspaper) and its roving correspondents, always ready to descend on arbitrary, lazy or laggard administrators and castigate them in print for their errors. Nor is any mention made of the centrally-promulgated "Rules for Pupils," which represents an attempt to prescribe—in Moscow—a code of conduct for over 40 million pupils throughout the country.

However, as one of my colleagues likes to put it: "In a sea without fish, even a crab is a fish," and in an area of Soviet study where little else is available, this book must be welcomed, if only conditionally.

Harold J. Noah

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NOTES & VIEWS

Moscow and the Search for Unity

By J. P. Sontag

EVER SINCE 1956, the Soviet Union has been engaged in persistent and painstaking attempts to restore a semblance of unity to the international Communist movement, and—as a first step—to convene an international conference of Communist parties. But on August 20, 1968, when Warsaw Pact forces suddenly occupied Czechoslovakia, these attempts received a severe—although seemingly temporary—setback. That Soviet efforts, on which so much energy and time had been expended, should now be so rudely vitiated is ironic, because the decision to invade Czechoslovakia was a result of the same set of fears and apprehensions that had originally impelled the Soviet Union to seek an international conference. Clearly, the Soviet leaders regarded the developments in Czechoslovakia as far more dangerous than the risk of alienating their Communist allies. In using force against a fraternal country, however, Moscow seriously damaged its position on the question of Communist unity. The immediate result was shock and disarray within the Communist ranks, and the postponement of the long-sought conference. Yet since Moscow was not to be deterred from its course, it soon redoubled its efforts—while finding itself in the distinctly disadvantageous role of having to justify itself once more *vis-à-vis* the more independent parties, especially in Western Europe.

The Soviet Union's reasons for convening a gathering of Communist parties are complex in that they reflect the difficulties inherent in providing an institutional form to the hallowed concept of "proletarian internationalism." A review of these reasons—and of past experiences in fashioning ideological and organizational unity—throws considerable light on the current outlook of the Soviet leadership and on the factors that have led it to devote so much energy and attention to events in Eastern Europe and in the Communist movement in general.

Mr. Sontag is an American student of Soviet affairs. This is his first appearance in Problems of Communism.

The Quest for Institutional Forms

The disintegration of the Second International prior to 1914 and its total collapse with the outbreak of World War I prompted Lenin to establish a new, tightly-knit international organization which he described as the "forerunner of the international republic of the Soviets." [1] The new Communist International —or Comintern—was based on the principle of "democratic centralism," which obligated the member parties to abide by the decisions of the central organ of the Comintern, the Executive Committee (ECCI). In contrast to the Second International with its "letter-box" executive, Zinoviev declared that the new Third International was to become "a single Communist Party having branches in different countries." [2]

[1] Quoted in E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, London, MacMillan & Co., 1953, Vol. III, p. 125.

[2] Quoted in Jane Degras, Ed., *The Communist International, 1919–1943*, Vol. I, London, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 127.

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That the new International was to be exclusive and subject to unquestioning discipline was clearly demonstrated by the stringent "21 conditions" for membership, promulgated at its Second Congress in 1920.[3] While the first few Comintern congresses still witnessed a considerable degree of disagreement and dispute among the member parties, the successive gatherings, held at irregular intervals, eventually became the means whereby policy changes—binding on all parties—were announced. Typically, such announcements involved sudden policy reversals causing enormous strain and strife within the movement: the shift from a united front policy to a hard line against "left deviationists," which was announced at the Sixth Congress in 1928, and the shift to a Popular Front policy sanctioned by the Seventh Congress in 1935 are two examples of major policy changes which were foisted upon the rank and file with little prior warning.

The Comintern very quickly became wholly dominated by Moscow. As one participant recalled, "the first and strongest impression that was made upon me as a delegate coming to the Third International was the Russian-ness of it—the way the Russians were organized to take everything over. This was something no foreign delegate was prepared for." [4] This same participant recalled that by the Sixth Congress the Soviet Communist Party completely dominated all other parties: "no matter how strong their position might be at home, no matter how popular the individual local leaders might be, they knew they had no chance if the Russian party was against them." [5]

The dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 was a result of the tactical necessity to improve relations with the Western allies. The development of the Cold War led in turn to the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau—the Cominform—in 1947. Paradoxically, the Cominform's major action was the expulsion of Yugoslavia from its ranks in 1948. In retrospect, this step was of the utmost importance, for it reflected the persistence of the belief that the movement had both an *organizational* framework (from which parties could be excluded) and a set of commonly accepted *beliefs* (deviation from which provided the basis and rationale for the excommunication of a heretic).

The expulsion of Yugoslavia illustrates another fact, too: the international Communist movement was meeting growing resistance in its attempts to impose defined organizational forms and ideological doctrines on its members. Subsequent events have provided ample evidence of the erosion of "proletarian internationalism," a concept that has been undermined by the idea of independence and equality among Communist parties. After Stalin's death, the Soviet leaders themselves came to recognize the force and impact of this desire for self-determination and have slowly attempted to adapt themselves to it. This adaptation, beginning with Khrushchev's abortive reconciliation with Tito in 1955, coincided with a constant search for new ways of tightening unity among the parties.

At first, an attempt was made to define a general policy line for the whole movement without resorting to such permanent organizational structures as the Comintern. After celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution in 1957, the ruling Communist parties met in Moscow to work out a new program which was to reflect the changes brought about by the momentous events of 1956 in Eastern Europe.

It was, ironically, largely because of the pressure of the Chinese Communists that the so-called "Moscow Declaration," issued at the conclusion of the meeting, emphasized not only the importance of "proletarian internationalism," but also the leading role of the CPSU within the Communist movement. The refusal of the Yugoslav party to sign the "Moscow Declaration" was not surprising inasmuch as it included a condemnation of revisionism.[6]

Schism and Aftermath

In the meantime, the differences between Moscow and Peking, at first half-muted, mounted in intensity, eventually leading not only to a serious rift between the two Communist giants, but to the formation of two opposing wings within the international Communist movement in general—one led by Moscow and the other looking to Peking for support—as well as to the emergence of so-called "neutrals." As the internal debates became gradually more acrimonious, the Soviet leaders increased their efforts to convene yet another international conference, the purpose of which would be to solve the disputes and reunite the warring parties.

The conference finally was held in Moscow at the end of 1960. It was attended by 81 parties, and resulted in another declaration of common principles and aims. Yet this time the affirmations of unity were far more

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 168–72.
[4] Manuel Gomez, "From Mexico to Moscow," *Survey* (London), No. 53 (October 1964), p. 44.
[5] Gomez, "From Mexico to Moscow: II," *Survey*, No. 55 (April 1965), p. 119.
[6] For the 1957 Declaration, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 22, 1957.

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apparent than real: essentially, the new declaration was little more than an attempt to paper over the differences between the conflicting factions. Yet the declaration proved important, not only because it expressed—however broadly—a single Communist position on almost all of the major issues of the time, but also because it set the precedent of an international Communist gathering as a forum in which contending forces attempt to score decisive victories over each other.[7]

The near-Byzantine maneuvers that characterized the attempts to bring about yet another international gathering in 1961–1964, however, soon receded in the face of the changes that were taking place within the movement and that had little to do with the Sino-Soviet quarrel as such. The major change was the growing autonomy of many parties. This, in turn, led to reluctance on the part of numerous parties to be drawn into public criticism of one another. As more parties began to pursue a more independent course, they became wary of engaging in attacks which might in time turn against them. Thus when, at the end of 1964, the CPSU scheduled a consultative meeting in preparation for a full-dress conference, it was compelled to assure those invited that they "would not be called to condemn anybody, to 'excommunicate' anybody from the Communist movement and the socialist camp. . . ." [8]

The March 1965 consultative meeting (attended by 19 of the 26 parties invited) further demonstrated how obsolete the old conception of a conference had become. The significant differences of opinion among those parties that Moscow still could prevail upon to attend almost totally deprived the proceedings of any substantive content, thus displaying to all the world the great decline in Soviet influence over the international Communist movement.[9]

Despite these problems, however, the USSR and its supporters have not abandoned their efforts to forge a new framework of organizational and ideological unity. This effort began in earnest at the Bulgarian party congress in mid-November 1966 and gathered momentum throughout 1967. After the celebration marking the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution in November 1967, 18 of the original 26 members of the consultative commission met in Moscow and issued invitations to the 81 parties which had attended the 1960 meeting for a consultative meeting in Budapest at the end of February 1968. The meeting took place, attended by 67 parties, but was marred by the action of Rumania, which walked out during the course of the proceedings. The remaining parties issued invitations to all 88 formally recognized members of the Communist movement to attend an international conference of parties in Moscow on November 25, 1968. As noted earlier, the hostile reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia forced a postponement of the conference, which is now scheduled for May 1969.[10]

Divisive Forces

In assessing Moscow's current motivations, one is struck by the fact that substance—that is, the ideological program that is to emerge from this gathering—is no longer much of an issue. What is important is the organizational aspect—that is, the mere fact that Communist parties will be meeting under one roof. Why the Soviets are willing to settle for something which in the past would never have satisfied them may be gathered from examining the three factors that no doubt prompted this decision: the new phase of Sino-Soviet relations; nationalism; and dissent within the international Communist movement.

In August 1966, after almost two years of muted polemics, Moscow again took the offensive against Peking. Having concluded apparently that little more could be gained by continued restraint, the Soviet leadership set about attacking Maoist positions in a series of major pronouncements in *Pravda* and *Kommunist* as well as in routine propaganda.[11] These attacks had a dual purpose: to reply to similar Chinese tirades against the USSR, and to erode Chinese influence both outside and within the movement. While the charges hurled at Peking have been as varied as they have been vociferous, they have been largely dominated by one single motif—namely, that Maoism is the most dangerous manifestation of a serious malaise—"petit-bourgeois nationalism"—which threatens the Communist movement as a whole.

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[7] On the 1960 meeting, see Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 343–69. The 1960 statement can be found in the *World Marxist Review*, December 1960, pp. 4–25.

[8] On the maneuverings for a conference in the early 1960's, see the two books by William E. Griffith: *The Sino-Soviet Rift*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1964, pp. 35–36, 207–30; and *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964–1965*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1967, pp. 25–48, 78–91.

[9] See Griffith, *Sino-Soviet Relations* . . ., pp. 78–91.

[10] *Pravda*, Nov. 21, 1968.

[11] The major editorial articles appeared in *Pravda* on Sept. 16 and Nov. 27, 1966, and Feb. 16 and Aug. 16, 1967. See also G. Shakhnarzarov, "Kulturnaia revoliutsiia v Kitae i melkoburzhuaznyi avantiurizm," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, 1967, pp. 104–13; and P. Fedoseev, "Marksizm i maotszedunizm," *ibid.*, No. 5, 1967, pp. 107–22.

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According to Soviet spokesmen, at the time Chiang Kai-shek was defeated there existed in China a large peasant mass, a developed bourgeois and petit-bourgeois stratum, and a relatively small working class. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), according to these commentaries, admitted to its ranks many members from the petit-bourgeoisie—including Mao himself—whose inadequate understanding of Marxism-Leninism only helped to reinforce their petit-bourgeois outlook. Mao, say the Soviet spokesmen, deprived the working class of its rightful leading role in the forefront of the revolution. The dominance of petit-bourgeois ideology became particularly pernicious during China's period of transformation from democratic revolution to socialist revolution. It was at this time that Mao's "faulty philosophy and faulty political line of petit-bourgeois adventurism" distorted and then undermined the gains made by the CCP.[12]

Most of the Soviet literature on China centers its criticism on the subversion of the leading role of the working class, the destruction of the CCP, Mao's cult of personality, and China's "hegemonistic" foreign policy aspirations. As noted before, there is a dual purpose in the focus of this attack. First, the Soviets clearly want to discredit Mao as thoroughly as possible. At least as important to Moscow as this effort, however, is the need to arrest the forces of nationalism, which threaten to erode the Communist world. In this campaign, China serves both as a specific example of the evil effects of nationalism and also as an object lesson which the USSR uses to issue didactic warnings to other countries and parties.

The Soviets assert that the situation in the developing countries is often similar to conditions in China in that the rural population vastly outnumbers the urban proletariat, many of whom have only recently left the farm. As a recent editorial in *Kommunist* pointed out, "this phenomenon complicates the development of the revolutionary process because the non-proletarian strata of the population bring to it [the revolution] their own ideas. . . . Such ideas can, under certain conditions, deform proletarian ideology" [13] —of which China is a case in point.

This lesson was most sharply drawn by Frigyes Puja, a member of the Hungarian party's Central Committee, in a lecture given in May 1968. According to Puja, "The Chinese case indicates that the Communist parties must not for a moment give in to nationalist sentiments at the expense of proletarian internationalism." [14] This view has been echoed again and again in the Soviet press, leading, in fact, to the abandonment of the old doctrine of "revisionism" as the principal internal enemy of communism. Now, said *Kommunist* recently, "it is nationalism which represents the most serious danger for the Communist and entire revolutionary movement." [15] Similarly, in a speech in March 1968, Brezhnev said that imperialism "relies chiefly on nationalist and revisionist elements in its efforts to undermine the socialist system.[16]

It is clear, then, that the Soviet leaders hope that the May conference will revive a spirit of internationalism within the Communist movement. Yet they are not unaware of the difficulties that stand in their way. Brezhnev, in his speech commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, implied as much when he said that each party operates "on the basis of complete independence and self-reliance," but that "the strength and effectiveness of the struggle of this or that party" depend in part "on the scale and scope of cooperation of all detachments of the Communist movement." [17] With these words Brezhnev appeared to be searching for an acceptable balance between national and international obligations; his words, however, indicate an awareness of the struggle going on within many parties to satisfy the demands for national independence on the one hand and international cooperation on the other.

Nationalism is only one of the forces undermining the Communist movement today. An equally menacing danger is that of obsolescence, or at least the *appearance* of irrelevance. The insignificant—and belated—role played by the French CP in the strikes which crippled France in May 1968 is a case in point. The concept of "participatory democracy" raised by the French students as well as by those in many other countries is alien to the Communist vocabulary. So is the doctrine which makes the peasants the vanguard of revolution (an essential aspect of Maoist strategy). In addition, communism has found itself challenged by sundry theories such as "revolutionary voluntarism," exclusive reliance upon violence, an end to the class struggle, and even an "end" to all ideology.

While recognizing the existence of the new ideologies on the left, Moscow has tended to dismiss rather than

[12] P. Fedoseev, *loc. cit.*, p. 109. See also N. Kapchenko, "Ob istokakh politicheskovo kursa rukovodstva KPK," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, No. 3, 1967, pp. 15–27; and Brezhnev's speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, *Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1968.

[13] "O politicheskom kurse Mao Tsze-duna na mezhdunarodnoi arena," *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1968, p. 104.

[14] Frigyes Puja, "The Situation in China," *Information Bulletin* of the *World Marxist Review*, 11 (123) 1968, p. 25.

[15] *Loc. cit. supra* (footnote 13), p. 106.

[16] *Pravda*, March 29, 1968.

[17] *Ibid.*, Nov. 4, 1967.

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to refute them on intellectually and politically responsible grounds. It is interesting to note, for instance, the great sensitivity displayed by Soviet commentators with regard to the complex issues raised by the Czechoslovak liberals, and their reluctance to meet them head on. Instead, they have resorted to the same old slogans and formulas, to exegetical disquisitions on the relevance of Lenin's ideas to contemporary circumstances —all of which does not augur well for any serious ideological discussions at the forthcoming international conference.

Having examined the reasons for dissidence and division in the Communist movement, it is essential to examine the forces that still contribute to its unity. Because dissension is more obvious than unanimity, it is a common fallacy to underestimate the tenacious loyalty which the Soviet Union still continues to inspire, a loyalty which has after all induced more than sixty nations to heed Moscow's call for an international conference.

The reasons and motivations for this loyalty are varied. Those parties within the international Communist movement which are small, weak and relatively insignificant have little choice but to fall in step with Moscow's directives. With only minute constituencies and inadequate sources of income, they depend on Moscow for their very existence and thus are forced to accede to Soviet demands. Other parties are either nostalgically committed to the notion of an institutional framework which transcends national boundaries, or have accepted it for various tactical reasons—though not without serious reservations.

The Italian Communist Party (PCI)—Moscow's most prestigious convert to the cause of an international meeting—is a case in point. After considerable agonizing (and, probably, Soviet arm-twisting), the PCI finally announced its acquiescence in four articles written by General Secretary Luigi Longo in the autumn of 1967. Longo's articles vividly reflect the difficulty of reconciling the demands of Communist unity with party autonomy. While Soviet spokesmen have claimed that the reconciliation of national and international obligations is a "labor of love" for Communists, Longo has not found the question nearly so simple.[18] In the end, he gave his reluctant endorsement to a conference, recognizing that some steps had to be taken "unless we want to see the Communist movement degenerate to the level of social democracy." [19] Along with this support, however, he indicated his belief that a conference which decides little serves unity best. Both the British and French Communist parties have expressed similar reservations; while agreeing to attend the conference, they have insisted that no attempt be made to hamer out new policy directives.

The Polish and East German parties have, on the other hand, taken a position diametrically opposed to that of the Italians, French and British. At the consultative meeting in Budapest, the East German delegate, Erich Honecker, argued in favor of a general line binding on all parties; the CPSU would act as leader and guiding center of the movement. He did so, moreover, in a manner clearly calculated to antagonize the more nationalist parties, such as the Rumanian and Italian.[20]

In slightly less militant terms, the Polish delegate, Zenon Kliszko, argued against adopting vague, nonbinding resolutions at an international conference. Kliszko bitterly condemned those parties which had shirked their international responsibilities "in the name of wrongly understood sovereignty and independence." [21]

These slightly disguised attacks on Rumania, which were echoed as well by Bulgaria, reflect a deep concern in Pankow, Warsaw, and Sofia over the corrosive effect that Rumanian nationalism may have on treaty arrangements between Eastern Europe and the USSR. No doubt Polish support for a conference is in part a result of fears that a dissolution of Communist institutional arrangements could leave Poland dangerously alone in Central Europe.

For the reasons outlined above, then, Moscow was able to induce 66 parties to support the convocation of a world conference on November 25, 1968. The invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, fractured the fragile consensus among the Western European parties, some of whom—notably the French and Italian—combined condemnations of the invasion with demands that the conference be postponed. Their opposition was undoubtedly instrumental in inducing the preparatory commission which met on September 30 and October 1, 1968, to postpone the conference.[22]

The preparatory commission agreed to meet again on November 17, and in the intervening period the CPSU attempted to bring the French and the Italian parties back into line on the conference issue. Soviet pressure on the PCF and the PCI was successful. Both

[18] *Ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1968.
[19] *Rinascità* (Rome), Oct. 20, 1967.
[20] *Information Bulletin of the World Marxist Review*, 5-6-7 (117-118-119) 1968, pp. 120-33.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 54-67.
[22] *L'Unità* (Rome), Sept. 6, 1968; *L'Humanité* (Paris), Sept. 17, 1968; *Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1968.

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parties agreed that the conference should be held in Moscow in May 1969.[23]

The Price of Success

As we have seen, then, Moscow has expended an extraordinary amount of time and energy in pursuit of "international unity." Yet when the long-sought meeting finally takes place, its results—both immediate and long-rang—may well turn out to be highly detrimental to its organizers. It is becoming increasingly clear, after all, that non-ruling Communist parties can score successess at home only by forswearing their traditional obeisance to the USSR—that is, only by becoming more genuinely indigenous. A more sophisticated Soviet view would, of course, recognize the value of exploiting nationalist sentiment in the struggle against "the imperialist West"—which in the long run can be accomplished only by renouncing Soviet claims to hegemony over the international Communist movement. By pressuring the parties into accepting a conference, however, Moscow has only reaffirmed their submissive relationship to the USSR, thus dooming them, in effect, to permanent minority status within their own countries.

Moscow's adamant insistence on making a distinction between radicals and Communists, and its refusal—over the objections of the Rumanians and Italians—to admit non-Communist radicals to the conference may also have a corrosive effect on international communism.[24] Indeed, there is already wide suspicion that Moscow will try to use the conference to provide a new "ideological platform" for the movement. Soviet spokesmen assert that Moscow has no such intentions. Despite this, statements by Gus Hall of the CPUSA, a party not noted for its venturesome independence from Moscow, would seem to indicate that the Soviet leaders are harboring different plans. In his speech at the consultative meeting, which has now been reprinted in numerous Communist publications, Hall asserted that the movement must have "some organized system of relations"; he denied, however, that he sought to revive the Comintern. What he did suggest was the establishment of a Communist press service, the creation of study commissions, and the formation of a permanent committee to prepare for future world conferences.[25] It may be significant that the *World Marxist Review*, in reprinting Hall's speech, left out this final suggestion, clearly the most controversial of all. Yet even without this committee, Hall's plans would give the movement a superstructure which many parties would find too constricting. It is, however, unlikely that the CPSU will risk further defections during the conference by attempting to force reluctant parties to accept either unwanted institutional reforms such as Hall's or major new programmatic documents. Gus Hall's statements, as well as similar views voiced by the East Germans, may therefore be regarded as "trial balloons." But they *do* indicate in which direction the Soviet leaders are inclined to move.

* * *

ALL IN ALL, the most that Moscow can expect to achieve at the international Communist conference in May is a revival of the spirit—but without the substance—of Communist solidarity. Clearly, the Soviets believe that the image of a united international Communist movement has great symbolic value, even though its immediate practical value is negligible. Ideally, the conference will lay the groundwork for the establishment of permanent organizational ties in the future. Moscow has invested a great deal of effort, and has gambled a great deal of prestige, to convene the May conference in the hope that it will produce at least an impression of unity convincing enough to scare away the demons of division now threatening to devour Soviet authority and ideological orthodoxy in the once powerful and monolithic international Communist movement.

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[23] *Pravda*, Nov. 7, 16 and 21, 1968.

[24] Thus, V. Zagladin, a deputy chief of the international section of the CPSU, wrote in a recent article that "the world Communist movement is not a coalition of various political forces like the worldwide anti-imperialist movement, but is rather a militant alliance of likeminded persons based on the ideological platform of Marxism-Leninism and not tolerating deviations from its general principles." (V. Zagladin, "Aktualnaia problema kommunisticheskovo dvizheniia," in *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie* [Moscow], No. 2, 1968, p. 34.)

[25] The speech was published in *The Worker*, March 10, 1968; in the *Information Bulletin* of the *World Marxist Review*, 5–6–7 (117–118–119) 1968, pp. 113–18; and in the *World Marxist Review*, May 1968, pp. 32–38.

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Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC,* 20547.

Finland in World War II

TO THE EDITORS: In the May-June 1968 issue of this journal, Professor Pertti Pesonen, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Tampere, Finland, reviewed my book *Communism in Finland: A History and Interpretation.* His comments for the most part seemed appropriate; in fact, I found myself in agreement even with a number of the more critical remarks. But two points call for a response.

First, it was somewhat disturbing to find myself ridden out of the discipline of political science. As a "political historian," I do not discuss many problems which are of interest to readers "oriented more toward the political scientist's point of view." It seems to me that Professor Pesonen has a rather narrow, parochial view of his (and my) discipline. By way of information, it is perhaps worth noting that a year ago I attempted through a questionnaire to test the central hypothesis of my book. But the Communist members of the Finnish Parliament refused to respond; apparently only one member of the parliamentary group was in favor of answering the questionnaire. As has been noted by Professor Stein Rokkan in *The American Political Science Review* (September 1964, p. 678), attempts to derive information about communism through survey research are fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. This is an unfortunate fact of life.

Second, Professor Pesonen concludes from what I leave unsaid in my book that I have "a certain bias." The two illustrations selected to support his argument indicate that it may be the reviewer rather than the author who is one-sided. Professor Pesonen feels that I should have mentioned that peace was a primary objective of the Linkomies cabinet (March 5, 1943—August 8, 1944); also, I should have pointed out that "the peace terms which Finland rejected in early 1944 were more severe than the armistice agreement which she signed with the Soviet Union in September 1944." These questions are important ones for Finnish history (although not really germane to the subject of my book), and I welcome an opportunity to deal with each in some detail.

Admittedly peace was an *avowed* aim of the Linkomies Cabinet. But a number of facts raised doubts as to Linkomies' interest in and/or ability to achieve peace. He belonged to the conservative Coalition Party, which was noted for its hostility to the Soviet Union, and he was considered by many (see Vaino Tanner, *Suomen tie rauhaan 1943–44,* p. 41) to be favorably inclined toward Germany at the time he was being considered for the position of prime minister. A 1943 statement by Linkomies was not reassuring: "Finland is a great power; about that there can be no doubt." In June 1944, during the tenure of the Linkomies cabinet, the President of Finland pledged in a letter to Hitler that neither he (Risto Ryti) nor a cabinet named by him would conclude a separate peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Finland had become an ally of Germany in the Second World War. In 1946 Linkomies and Ryti were convicted as "war responsibles" (*sotasyyllisia*) and were sentenced to prison for periods of five and one-half and ten years respectively.

The question about peace terms in 1944 is also interesting and somewhat more complicated. The assertion of Professor Pesonen (and Linkomies) that the armistice terms were less severe than the terms rejected by Finland in the spring of the same year rests on two points. In the armistice agreement, Finland was not bound to oust or intern *within one month* the German troops in Finland; and the reparations burden was reduced from $600,000,000 to $300,000,000. The latter figure was in world market prices of 1938, but there was, and perhaps still is, some uncertainty as to the dollar base for the first figure (see Tanner, pp. 231, 233–34). In any case, those who argue that the armistice terms were less onerous fail to consider one important *addition* in the terms of September 1944: Finland was forced to lease territory some twelve miles west of Helsinki to the Soviet Union for fifty years as a naval base. The Soviet Union also obtained the use of Finnish transportation facilities to move personnel and material between that base (Porkkala) and the Soviet Union. Marshal Mannerheim was so concerned by the loss of Porkkala that he urged that the Finnish capital be moved west to Turku (see Tanner, p 390; J. K. Paasikivi, *Paasikiven linja,* Vol. I. pp. 192–93). In the opinion of Finland's greatest statesman, J. K. Paasikivi, the loss of Porkkala made the terms of the armistice harsher than the terms which had been rejected in the spring (see J. K. Paasikivi, *Paasikiven muistelmia sortovuosilta,* Vol. I, p. 79).

In sum, it is undoubtedly useful for "political historians" to concern themselves with behavioral techniques, but it

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is equally useful for "political scientists" (as defined by Professor Pesonen) to study in more depth "political history."

JOHN H. HODGSON
Department of Political Science
Syracuse University

MR. PESONEN REPLIES: I wish to thank Professor John H. Hodgson for his interest in the book review, and the Editors for offering me an opportunity to read his letter before publication.

Indeed, political historians and political scientists can learn from each other, and when I say that they represent different scientific approaches, I do not imply that the one does less important work than the other. But Professor Hodgson is mistaken if he really equates political science with "behavioral techniques." Source materials and techniques of analysis do not in principle differentiate between the two approaches. Their main difference lies in whether facts are subjected to chronological or social-science-type systematic presentation and interpretation. Professor Hodgson's book clearly belongs to the former category, although I would also consider his main theme—the existence of a tension between nationalism and Marxism—a direct contribution to systematic political science.

Professor Hodgson's discussion of two details is an additional indication of our divergent views of history. The trial of "war responsibles" in 1946 was contrary to Finland's legal system, but it had to be conducted because the Allied powers so demanded. The letter of President Ryti, in June 1944, did not have the force of a valid treaty because he purposely did not submit it to Parliament for ratification. Its unconstitutionality was not realized by the Germans, and the latest German equipment was soon obtained and put to successful use by the Finnish army. One might add in parentheses that seemingly Ryti's letter also helped the United States out of its ambivalent position of somehow understanding Finland's anti-Stalin fight while conducting pro-Stalin policies. But in general, President Ryti's letter, together with his decision not to involve Parliament with the pledge, is recognized as having been a patriotic and necessary deed: the pledge became void as soon as the President resigned in August 1944. Furthermore, the new President, C. G. Mannerheim, also nominated a conservative prime minister (A. Hackzell). The armistice was signed in September 1944.

To the comparison of the two sets of peace terms I should like to add one variable. The lease of territory, which in practice lasted only until 1955, was a possibility, whereas victory over the German troops in but one month and the $600 million of war reparations would have been an impossibility.

Readers' Comments

TO THE EDITORS: Mr. Ford's description of your publication (in his letter published in the March-April 1968 issue) as "anti-Soviet and anti-Communist propaganda" is surely ill-founded. Such a label could be placed on a few publications known to me, compared to which *Problems of Communism* could be regarded as rather "leftish" in character. I find this publication to be the most factual and objective of all in its presentation of Communist problems.

Mr. Ford criticizes *PoC* for existing, without giving a convincing argument for his case at all. He suggests that ". . . you put your own house in order, and then . . . preach to the rest of the world." True, injustices abound on both sides of the Iron Curtain, but how can he compare the position of the unemployed and the Negro in the USA with, say, the tragic fate of the nations subjugated by the Soviet Union after World War II and—with just a few exceptions—still oppressed by Communist dictatorships?

Most Western publications—including newspapers—are concerned with problems of the "capitalist" world. Only a few are rightly devoted to the study of communism . . . The situation in Eastern Europe and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in particular should be studied by all (including Mr. Ford) who wish to ascertain the "progress" of the Communist system in a developed society.

ADAM KOSSOWSKI
Chairman (Manchester Branch),
Association of Polish Students in Exile
Great Britain

TO THE EDITORS: In your March-April issue I was surprised to read the letter from Mr. Maxim Ford of, Cardiff, Great Britain. I wonder what important point it contained to deserve the wastage of your valuable space. *Problems of Communism* is needed by us because it is the only available authenticated document about developments behind the Iron Curtain. A free country like the United States or Great Britain, or for the matter any democratic country, is such an open book, and every aspect of its life is so well publicized that no separate publication is needed on such lines as required by Mr. Ford . . . I wonder if Mr. Ford knows that it would be impossible for him to write such a letter if, perchance, his own country—to the distress of humanity—were to go Communist.

In fact, my grievance against the USA or Great Britain is that they are so insolently indifferent about supplying even their free publications to their well-wishers . . . We can understand why the Soviet or Chinese Embassies refuse to honor our request for material on crime in their countries. But why do the British and US Embassies similarly refuse to supply us with such innocent reports as *Crime in the USA* or *Crime in the United Kingdom*, as if these were secret documents which must not be read by an Indian?

PARIPURNANAND VARMA
President,
All-India Crime Prevention Society
Behari Niwas, Kanpur, India

TO THE EDITORS: In his letter, Mr. Ford exhibited typical Communist arrogance, absence of logic, and—what is more important—ignorance of Soviet reality. Mr. Ford, apparently, trusts only the Soviet press. So, in order to convince him that, contrary to his conviction, there *is* unemployment in the USSR, I shall cite only recent Soviet publications.

Literaturnaia gazeta, Jan. 17, 1968: "Our comrades studying the resources of manpower in, say, Bashkiriia, state that in that republic there is no shortage of manpower in the villages. And in some places there is even a surplus." In another article in the same paper, we read: "We could have had construction workers of our own, comrades. At the expense of surplus population (*izbytochnoe naselenie*). Kolkhozes with surplus population could have concluded agreements with the kolkhozes where there is a shortage of manpower at the time of harvesting." In the same paper

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(p. 11), in an article on the future of small towns, the economist Pereveden-tsev writes as follows: "There are two main reasons for the creation of industrial enterprises in a small town. First of all, there is almost always a surplus of manpower."

Surely, the main reason why the USSR is not now facing a multimillion unemployment problem is the country's low productivity. In the August 1966 issue of *Novyi mir*, Yu. Chernichanko wrote that there were 26,800 "unoccupied persons" in the towns of Pskov province alone. *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Feb. 7, 1968), in the article "Peasant and Earth," tells of a kolkhoz where a brigade of 14 men organized along "new economic principles" performed the job of 100 workers. The author writes: "If we accept our discovery as a norm, we arrive at a surprising conclusion. In this region there were 125,000 hectares of arable land, and the number of men working there is about 12,000, *i.e.*, 11,000 more than the norm. A surplus of manpower? And this in one region only? And what about the province? And on a still larger scale?"

To take another example, here is what Ye. Lopatina wrote in *Literaturnaia gazeta* of May 15, 1968: "In Leningrad there is a substantial shortage of manpower, and in Rostov province an enormous surplus of non-working hands (*nerabotaiushchikh rabochikh ruk*)." In the town of Shakhty a textile factory is being constructed "especially to provide jobs for non-working (*nerabotaiushchikh*) wives and daughters of local miners." Moreover, from the same article we learn that the Central Statistical Board of the USSR "exaggerated the number of unemployed in the RSFSR." So, there are even official Soviet statistics of unemployment, but . . . secret ones. And this secrecy is sufficient to convince a naive Mr. Ford. Let him study Russian and start reading Soviet papers. Still better, let him live and work for one year anywhere in the USSR in the conditions of the ordinary Soviet man.

L.R.
Tel Aviv,
Israel

NOTE: *The author, whose identity is known to the Editors, prefers to remain anonymous so as not to jeopardize his relatives in the USSR.*

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